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This Article explores the tension between the limited power of the federal government to im-
plement the ICJ’s ruling and the authority of individual U.S. states to effect criminal justice, in
consideration of the Vienna Convention and the requirements of the Avena decision. The applica-
tion of international law within the U.S. federal system will be analyzed, in particular with respect
to the Avena, LaGrand, and Breard cases. In view of those cases, the efficacy of remedies in the
U.S. federal system for the correction of past violations as well as the prevention of future breaches
of the Vienna Convention will be addressed, with a look at possibilities for enforcement by the na-
tional government as well as possibilities for state action. Part I generally discusses the challenges
that federal States encounter in the international legal community with a focus on attribution of
acts to the State and the compliance of State organs. Part II illustrates the functioning of the U.S.
federal system and its relationship with the international community, specifically concentrating on
the status of treaties in the United States. Part III explains the doctrine of procedural default and
provides a selected case analysis to understand the framework in which the Avena case is found.
The cases highlight a broad array of Vienna Convention violations at the various levels of govern-
ment. Part IV provides an in-depth outlining of Breard and LaGrand, the cases preceding Avena,
and their relevant issues in order to provide a backdrop for Avena so as to facilitate a better under-
standing of the circumstances in which the case was decided. Part V presents a detailed look at the
Avena case, which includes the facts and the decision and rationale of the ICJ. In addition, this Part
reviews the recourse requested by Mexico in Avena. Part VI expounds upon the implementation
of the ICJ decision in Avena and discusses whether U.S. states may choose to follow the decision
of the ICJ despite a contrary ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court as seen in Breard, and whether
Breard is actually valid precedent. In addition, two cases are offered to highlight the differences in
approach. Part VII addresses the responsibility of the United States to provide avenues of redress.
In addition, the doctrine of good faith will be emphasized as a necessity when taking action that
entails international ramifications. Miscellaneous instances are then offered as examples of the
exercise of good faith. Part VIII analyzes the various ways in which the U.S. federal government,
responsible for its state organs, can secure state compliance with federal treaties, with an empha-
sis on federal action that can be taken. Part IX advocates the implementation of a Miranda-style
warning as mandatory throughout the United States as a means of avoiding possible future Vienna
Convention violations and concludes with a specific recommendation.
REVISITING MIRANDA AFTER AVENA:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF MEXICO V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
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Elizabeth Samson*
INTRODUCTION
From its founding, the United States has acknowledged and
emphasized the importance of amicable relations with its neigh-
bors and countries around the world.' Indeed, as U.S. citizens
had been laid victim to one of the most grievous violations of
consular and diplomatic rights in the Iranian hostage crisis,2 the
United States has firmly pursued these rights on behalf of itself
as a Nation and on behalf of U.S. citizens abroad. Notwithstand-
ing that undertaking, however, the United States has not fully
succeeded in effecting the implementation of the terms set forth
in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 3 ("Vienna
Convention" or "Convention") within its own territory.4
In the field of consular relations, Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals,5 decided by the International Court of Justice (the
"ICJ" or the "Court")6 on March 31, 2004, is a groundbreaking
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law; LL.M. in International and European
Law, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The author would like to thank Prof.
Andr6 Nollkaemper, Professor of Public International Law and Director of the Amster-
dam Center for International Law at the University of Amsterdam, for his guidance and
support. (This Article was written before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006)-eds.)
1. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
2. See generally United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran;
Iranian Hostage crisis), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
(entered into force Mar. 19, 1967, entered into force in the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969) [herein-
after Vienna Convention or Convention]. The Vienna Convention is a multilateral
treaty.
4. See William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 259 (1998).
5. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
6. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. See Press Release,
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case in international jurisprudence. The premise of the case is
that U.S. law enforcement officials failed to inform detained
Mexican nationals of their right to consular access pursuant to
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention,7 which ultimately resulted
in the application of the "procedural default" rule. This pre-
vented the detainees from bringing a claim based on their Vi-
enna Convention rights, thus violating the Convention and the
rights of those detainees.8
In Avena, the United States asserted that the procedural de-
fault rule of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), 9 as set forth by the Supreme Court in Breard v.
Greene1" is a defense to any deficiencies in notification and Vi-
enna Convention implementation."a The ICJ in Avena, drawing
on its previous ruling in the LaGrand Case,12 found the applica-
tion of the procedural default rule with respect to Vienna Con-
vention claims to be against international law. The ICJ therefore
required the United States to establish a method by which the
cases could be reviewed and reconsidered so that the intent of
the Vienna Convention would be given full effect.1"
The purpose of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions is to promote the efficient use of consular offices1 4 by gen-
erally governing consular issues between a majority of the Na-
tions of the world. 5 The Vienna Convention has been broadly
ratified, presently by more than 165 States, thereby making it
applicable to nearly all foreign nationals who are arrested on
International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), The Court Finds That the United States of
America has Breached its Obligations to Mr. Avena and 50 Other Mexican Nationals
and to Mexico Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ICJ Press Release
2004/16 (2004).
7. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36.
8. See infra Parts IV.A, VI and accompanying notes.
9. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. 1961(1)) [hereinafter AEDPA].
10. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
11. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 63, 1 134.
12. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
13. For a full explanation of the facts of the case and the reasoning of the ICJ, see
infra Part VI and accompanying notes.
14. See Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and Its Effect on Reciprocity for United States Citizens Abroad, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1,
12 (2004).
15. See Alan Macina, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals: The Litmus for LaGrand
and the Future of Consular Rights in the United States, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 115, 120 (2003).
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criminal charges. 6 The Vienna Convention was adopted on
April 24, 1963 in Vienna, Austria, and entered into force on
March 19, 1967.17 The U.S. Senate ratified both the Vienna
Convention and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes on October 22, 1969.18 President
Nixon formally ratified the Vienna Convention for the United
States on November 12, 1969.19 The ratification was deposited
on November 24, 1969, and it entered into force for the United
States on December 24, 1969.20
The United States signed the Vienna Convention with a
view towards affording rights to foreign nationals on U.S. soil
and achieving reciprocity with other Nations for U.S. nationals
on foreign soil.2 1 However, since the adoption of the Vienna
Convention by the United States in 1969, there have been many
reported violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and
the victims have, for the most part, not received redress. In es-
sence, the Vienna Convention provides rights, but there are no
real or broadly implemented remedies22 in the United States to
date.23
The ICJ has described Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion24 as "an interrelated regime designed to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the system of consular protection. 25 Paragraphs
1 (b) and 2 of Article 36 are pivotal to the discussion at hand and
16. See John Quigley, The Law of State Responsibility and the Right to Consular Access,
11 vILL.MET-rE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 39, 41 (2004).
17. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 3.
18. See Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involve-
ment in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REv. 307, 314
(1999).
19. See Valerie Epps, Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Time
for Remedies, 11 WILLAMErrE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 1, 6-7 (2004).
20. See Aceves, supra note 4, at 268-69.
21. See id. at 259.
22. There is one instance in which a court did provide relief in a claim brought on
the grounds of a Vienna Convention violation. See infra Part VIII.A and accompanying
notes.
23. See Linda E. Carter, Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of
Review and Reconsideration Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 25 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 117, 121 (2003).
24. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36. Article 36 is entitled "Communi-
cation and contact with nationals of the sending State." For a full citation of the article
and paragraphs, see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
25. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 46, 74
(Mar. 31) (citing LaGrand Case, 2001 I.CJ. 466 (June 27)).
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to the understanding of the Avena case as well as other cases in
which Vienna Convention violations are presented. 26 These Arti-
cles state as follows:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular func-
tions relating to nationals of the sending State:
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its con-
sular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person ar-
rested, in prison, custody or detention shall be for-
warded by the said authorities without delay. The
said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the
said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to
the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article
are intended.
2 7
As the ramifications of Avena presently unfold, many questions
have been raised regarding the implications of this case on the
obligations of the United States with respect to these paragraphs,
which lie at the heart of the controversy of Avena and its preced-
ing cases, most important of which are Breard and LaGrand.
These cases bring to light the challenge of complying with the
Vienna Convention in the United States in view of its complex
26. Id. 14.
27. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36. It is relevant to note that Article 36
was nearly omitted from the Vienna Convention, due to intense debate about its inclu-
sion at the plenary meetings of the Vienna Convention. The notification requirement
of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), however, was not even included in the debate, because it
was only added to the draft of Article 36 just before signing. Interestingly, the U.S.
delegation to the Vienna Convention stated that the requirement of notification "ha[d]
the virtue of setting out a requirement which [was] not beyond means of practical im-
plementation in the United States, and, at the same time, [was] useful to the consular
service of the United States in the protection of [its] citizens abroad." Vadnais, supra
note 18, at 314 (citing Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna, Austria, March 4 to April 22, 1963, S. Exec.
Doc. E., 91st Cong., at 60 (1969)).
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system of federal government. 28
This Article explores the tension between the limited power
of the federal government to implement the ICJ's ruling and the
authority of individual U.S. states to effect criminal justice, in
consideration of the Vienna Convention and the requirements
of the Avena decision. 29 The application of international law
within the U.S. federal system will be analyzed, in particular with
respect to the Avena, LaGrand, and Breard cases. In view of those
cases, the efficacy of remedies in the U.S. federal system for the
correction of past violations as well as the prevention of future
breaches of the Vienna Convention will be addressed, with a
look at possibilities for enforcement by the national government
as well as possibilities for state action.
Part I generally discusses the challenges that federal States
encounter in the international legal community with a focus on
attribution of acts to the State and the compliance of State or-
gans.
Part II illustrates the functioning of the U.S. federal system
and its relationship with the international community, specifi-
cally concentrating on the status of treaties in the United States.
Part III explains the doctrine of procedural default and pro-
vides a selected case analysis to understand the framework in
which the Avena case is found. The cases highlight a broad array
of Vienna Convention violations at the various levels of govern-
ment.
Part IV provides an in-depth outlining of Breard and
LaGrand, the cases preceding Avena, and their relevant issues in
order to provide a backdrop for Avena so as to facilitate a better
understanding of the circumstances in which the case was de-
cided.
Part V presents a detailed look at the Avena case, which in-
cludes the facts and the decision and rationale of the ICJ. In
addition, this Part reviews the recourse requested by Mexico in
Avena.
28. In cases prior to Avena, many Nations have discreetly issued supporting affida-
vits for detainees, but the governments of Paraguay, Germany, and most recently Mex-
ico in Avena, have been at the forefront of the struggle to ensure that the Vienna Con-
vention is relevant as applied to their citizens. See Carter, supra note 23, at 121. Those
cases will be highlighted in this Article.
29. It must be noted that throughout this Article, "state" refers to one of the fifty
United States, while "State" refers to a country or Nation.
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Part VI expounds upon the implementation of the ICJ deci-
sion in Avena and discusses whether U.S. states may choose to
follow the decision of the ICJ despite a contrary ruling by the
U.S. Supreme Court as seen in Breard, and whether Breard is ac-
tually valid precedent. In addition, two cases are offered to high-
light the differences in approach.
Part VII addresses the responsibility of the United States to
provide avenues of redress. In addition, the doctrine of good
faith will be emphasized as a necessity when taking action that
entails international ramifications. Miscellaneous instances are
then offered as examples of the exercise of good faith.
Part VIII analyzes the various ways in which the U.S. federal
government, responsible for its state organs, can secure state
compliance with federal treaties, with an emphasis on federal ac-
tion that can be taken.
Part IX advocates the implementation of a Miranda-style
warning as mandatory throughout the United States as a means
of avoiding possible future Vienna Convention violations and
concludes with a specific recommendation.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part discusses three interrelated ideas. The first sec-
tion addresses the conflict that federalism can pose due to the
division of power between central and local governments, when
States attempt to implement international legal rules within a
national legal system. The second section addresses the respon-
sibility of a State for any action taken by one of its organs. The
third section addresses the obligations of States to enforce treaty
compliance by its organs.
A. Federalism and the Tension Between International and
National Law
In a complex international legal order, there is a constant
tension between international and national law,3" especially in a
State with a federal system of government. International law has
30. See Jeremy White, A New Remedy Stresses the Need for International Education: The
Impact of the LaGrand Case on a Domestic Court's Violation of a Foreign National's Consular
Relations Rights Under the Vienna Convention, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 295, 305
(2003).
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not generally accepted the rigidity of a federal structure of a na-
tional government as a pretext for breach of the Nation's obliga-
tions." For instance, in a 1932 Advisory Opinion, the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice ("Permanent Court") de-
clared that "[a] State cannot adduce as against another State its
own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent
upon it under international law or treaties in force. '32 The Per-
manent Court went even further, stating that "[a] State which
has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make
in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to en-
sure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
33
Moreover, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of
1969 ("VCLT")3 4 prohibits a Nation from invoking its federal
structure as an excuse for breach.3 5 Article 27 of the VCLT
states that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. "36 This Arti-
cle implies a preexisting rule of customary international law that
does not permit exceptions for federal States.3 7
Though the rule put forth in Article 27 seems unambigu-
ous, the challenges that federal governments face in balancing
the powers of their central and local governments continue to
present themselves. An example of this difficulty is when a na-
tional government ratifies a self-executing treaty in a federal
State with a general supremacy doctrine, conforming the State's
international commitments to domestic law should be an auto-
31. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. Though signed by U.S.
President Richard Nixon on April 24, 1970, the United States has yet to ratify the VCLT.
See United Nations, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
ch. XXIII § 1, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishin-
ternetbible/partl/chapterXXIII/treatyl .asp.
32. Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/
B) No. 44, at 24 (Feb. 4).
33. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21).
34. See VCLT, supra note 31.
35. See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 403, 450 (2003).
36. VCLT, supra note 31, art. 27. Article 27 continues, stating that "[this rule is
without prejudice to Article 46[,]" which concerns the provisions of internal law regard-
ing the competence to conclude treaties. Id.
37. See Swaine, supra note 35, at 450. A more specific method by which federalism
is denied as a pretext for breach is by holding governments responsible for the acts of
their organs. See infta Part I.B.
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matic undertaking.3 However, the State's constitutional order
may cause the provisions of the treaty to not be automatically
performed. 9 For instance, in the United States, where the na-
tional government ratifies treaties such as the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations, the state and local authorities are
left with the responsibility of implementing specific articles such
as Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention,40 and
oftentimes do not do so. Consequently, despite what may be the
best of intentions to fulfill their obligations, federal States, be-
cause of their structure, can face challenges when it comes to
domestic implementation of their international responsibilities.
B. State Responsibility and Unity of the State
The responsibility of a federal State for its member states
can often pose conflicts between local law and international
law.4 ' As early as 1851, there have been instances of federal
States being held responsible for the actions of their component
states.4 2 In that year, in the United States there were riots in
New Orleans, Louisiana, in which the Consulate of Spain was
raided and Spanish businesses were destroyed.4" Even though
the acts were committed in Louisiana and the state of Louisiana
was factually liable for the incident, the government of Spain re-
quested restitution from the U.S. Government,44 holding it re-
sponsible for the act of its component state.
In the past, the ICJ has applied the law of State Responsibil-
ity to remedy treaty breaches.4" The law of State Responsibility is
binding on States, even in the absence of any entry into a treaty,
as indicated in cases asserting that customary law is law even in
the absence of a treaty indication.46 The International Law
Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
38. See Swaine, supra note 35, at 454.
39. See id. at 453-55.
40. See U.S. Dep't of State, Consular Notification and Access, Part 5: Legal Mate-
rial, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR"), http://travel.state.gov/law/
consular/consular744.html#vccr (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
41. See IVAN BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 84 (1973).
42. See id. at 87-88 (giving an example of a Spanish request for redress to the
United States over an incident in New Orleans, Louisiana).
43. See BERNIER, supra note 41, at 88.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
46. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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tionally Wrongful Acts ("ILC Articles")4 7 address the issue of a
State's responsibility for its obligations in international law.4" Ar-
ticle 4 of the ILC Articles holds a State responsible under inter-
national law for the conduct of any State organ, "whether the
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other func-
tions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State
.... -" The Principle of Unity of the State asseverates that, pur-
suant to Article 4, all acts of all State organs are treated equally.5"
There is no difference between the President and lower officials,
between the judicial, legislative, and executive bodies, between a
national government and the state governments-all are repre-
sentative of the State to the same degree.
Pursuant to the laws of State Responsibility, attribution of
the acts of State organs to the State itself is to be expected, be-
cause under international law, the State and its organs are one
unit. Therefore, in a Nation with a federal system of govern-
ment, the actions taken by one state in the system are attributed
to the federal government, and in the same vein, the acts and
obligations of the national government are binding upon the
states as federal organs.
C. State Implementation of International Law:
Compliance of State Organs
It has been the practice to include in certain treaties obliga-
tions on States to take measures to apply rules of international
law. For instance, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") 1 includes a clause pertaining to federalism in Article
XXIV(12), which states that "[e]very contracting party shall take
such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure ob-
servance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and
47. State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second
Reading, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1
(2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles].
48. See Quigley, supra note 16, at 50.
49. ILC Articles, supra note 47, art. 4. The Article further notes that "[a]n organ
includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law
of the State." Id.
50. See id.
51. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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local governments and authorities within its territories. "52 The
Article shows that the obligations of GATT were placed upon the
State to ensure that its organs comply with the agreement and,
thereby, making the State liable for any breaches by its organs.53
In the Preparatory Committee to GATT, the United States
expressed that " [i] t is necessary to distinguish between central or
federal governments, which undertake these obligations in a
firm way, and local authorities which are not strictly bound, so to
speak, by the provisions of the Agreement, depending of course
upon the constitutional procedure of the country concerned."54
In disputes and instruments of the WTO, there continues to be a
strong differentiation between the State's central government
and its various organs. The WTO holds the State liable for any
breach, even in circumstances in which the State does not have
the constitutional authority to control the acts of its organs.55
As certain treaties such as GATT have taken special pains to
clarify that notion to its signatories, in light of the aforemen-
tioned, the States are to be held accountable for the acts of their
organs. However, some treaties do not make that level of ac-
countability particularly clear. For instance, the lack of specific-
ity in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations as to the extent of the responsibility of the na-
tional government is evident in that it only requires that the
Article "be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations
of the receiving State" and that those laws and regulations "en-
able full effect to be given" to the Article, without clearly defin-
ing "full effect. ' 56 In that regard, although it seems that the re-
sponsibility of the entire State is implied, that there is no men-
tion of the State organs could perhaps raise doubts about their
liability.
Regardless of whether there is inclusion of the responsibility
of State organs in the terms of a treaty, in light of Article 4 of the
ILC Articles as discussed in the previous section, the responsibil-
52. Id. art. XXIV(12).
53. Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of State
Organs, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45, 99 (2003).
54. Id. at 99 (citing GATT ANALYTIcAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE
772 (6th ed. 1994)).
55. See Ferdinandusse, supra note 53, at 100-01.
56. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36, 36(2).
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ity of States for the acts of their organs is unequivocal under in-
ternational law.
II. US. FE)ERALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA:
THE STATUS OF TREATIES IN THE UNITED STATES
Part II examines the complexity of the U.S. federal system.
The historical background explains how the difficulty of treaty
compliance due to U.S. federalism is not a twentieth-century
problem, but rather that this problem even has roots in the very
first years of the establishment of the United States as a Nation.
The next section analyzes the division of powers in the U.S. fed-
eral system generally, and specifically the clash between the
power of the federal government to engage in foreign affairs
with the power of the states to administer criminal justice. The
final section takes a different turn and introduces the "later-in-
time" rule and the Charming Betsy57 doctrine which are instru-
mental in our understanding of the hierarchy of laws in the
United States as well as the perception that exists when national
law conflicts with treaty law. The purpose of this Part is to pro-
vide a backdrop to understand how the nature of the U.S. fed-
eral system poses challenges to Vienna Convention implementa-
tion, and will be discussed more in-depth throughout this article.
A. Historical Background
The difficulty that the United States encounters in being a
federal State on the global stage dates from the earliest days of
the establishment of the United States as a Nation. At that time,
the founding fathers looked at the role of the United States, not
as an isolated entity, but as a participant in world affairs with a
particular emphasis placed on the great significance of interna-
tional alliances. In fact, one of the primary impetuses leading to
the Constitutional Convention was that individual states did not
observe the treaties made by the Continental Congress. 58
The Federalist Papers support the proposition that a plausi-
ble interpretation of the intent of the Framers of the Constitu-
57. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
58. Note, Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of
the Law of Nations?, 116 HARv. L. REv. 654, 2665 (2003) [hereinafter Too Sovereign But
Not Sovereign Enough] (citing Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 156 (2d. 1996)).
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tion ("Framers") was to grant the federal government the power
and perhaps even the obligation to guarantee that states adhere
to U.S. treaty obligations.59 For instance, in Federalist 80, Alex-
ander Hamilton argued that "the peace of the whole ought not
to be left at the disposal of a part ... ."0 Indeed, the most
important lesson that the Framers learned from the failed Arti-
cles of Confederation was that "the federal government had to
have sufficient power to ensure that any obligations it undertook
to foreign countries would be observed by the states."6" Other-
wise, any Nation of the world could simply establish a federalist
system in order to violate treaty obligations by allowing its com-
ponent states to perpetrate the violations.
6 2
The Framers thought it essential that the states be bound to
the agreements into which the new national government en-
tered because the potential security of the new Nation would be
hanging in the balance. Thus, they included a clause in the
Constitution that not only made a treaty signed by the national
government the law of the land and, therefore, binding on the
states, but also made that treaty on par with the Constitution it-
self.6" Article VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution, also termed the
'Supremacy Clause,' 64 states:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.
6 5
The inclusion of this clause was to ensure that U.S. states
would not act independently of the national government with
respect to international relations. Despite this attempt at assur-
59. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
60. Id.
61. Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 58, at 2665 (quoting David M.
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Concep-
tion of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1101 (2000)).
62. See id. at 2666.
63. See infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes.
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ance, however, the federal system has been unable to prevent
conflict, as shown in the next section.
B. The U.S. Federal System and Treaty Observance
1. States Rights v. Federal Rights
In the U.S. federal system, when an international treaty is to
be implemented by state officials, there is a conflict between two
fundamental principles of U.S. government: the power of the
federal government to conduct foreign relations on the one
hand and the federal government's limited ability to compel
states to execute national policy on the other.66 To be sure, bal-
ancing the powers and rights of U.S. states with the power of the
national or "federal" U.S. government to implement decisions of
international law is a rather complicated undertaking. The fed-
eral government has the power to enter into treaties and this
power must be reconciled with the right of the states to adminis-
ter justice without intervention from the federal government,
while at the same time complying with the treaty as the law of the
land.6 7
James Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers that "[t]he
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in
the state governments are numerous and indefinite."6 The
powers of the federal government, which are outlined in the
Constitution of the United States as indicated by Madison, are
termed the "enumerated powers. "69 These powers are limited by
the Constitution, enabling Congress to legislate only in areas in
which it has authority.7" Within these areas of authority is the
power to conduct foreign affairs. All other powers are subject to
the authority of the individual states7 1 and are termed the "re-
66. SeeJoshua A. Brook, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations of the
Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 575
(2004).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
70. Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the Holland Ca-
veat: Congressional Power to Implement Treaties, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 318 (2004).
71. U.S. CONST. AMEND. X. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
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served powers," among which is the administration of criminal
justice in the states' territories.
Early U.S. Supreme Court decisions took care to invalidate
any state law that conflicted with international treaties entered
into by the United States.72 For instance, in Ware v. Hylton73 in
1796, a Virginia statute that was at odds with the Treaty of Paris74
was invalidated by the Supreme Court. More recently, in Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council, the Supreme Court affirmed the
invalidation of a Massachusetts statute that imposed sanctions on
the government of Burma.75 The Court found that federal legis-
lation authorizing the President to impose sanctions on Burma if
certain criteria were met preempted the state law. 6 The Court
stated that "the state Act is at odds with the President's intended
authority to speak for the United States among the world's na-
tions .... [It] compromise Es] the very capacity of the President
to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other gov-
ernments."77 These examples show that steps have been taken
to ensure that the powers of the federal government remain sep-
arate from the powers of the states, with special attention paid to
the preservation of the power of the federal government to con-
duct foreign affairs and to enter into treaties without state inter-
ference.
2. The Federal Foreign Affairs Power to Enter into Treaties
The federal government has the enumerated power and ex-
72. See Brook, supra note 66, at 582.
73. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (striking down a Virginia law that
canceled debts owed to British subjects). For an extended exploration of Ware, see
John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights, 29 FoRD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 552, 554-56 (2006).
74. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. In the Treaty of Paris,
Great Britain recognized the independence of the United States.
75. See Brook, supra note 66, at 582, (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000)).
76. Id.
77. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380-81. Dicta in other Supreme Court cases confirm the
primacy of the national government in international relations. See, e.g., Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) ("[R]ules of international law should not be
left to divergent ... and parochial state interpretations."); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is not shared by the states; it is vested
in the national government exclusively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937) ("[Iun respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to
such purposes, the state ... does not exist.").
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clusive authority to conduct foreign affairs.78 The Constitution
expressly furnishes the federal government with several powers
that are necessary to conduct foreign relations79 and withholds
that same authority from the states.8" Among those powers is the
power vested in the President to enter into treaties with foreign
Nations "by and with the [a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Sen-
ate."8 Elsewhere in the Constitution, the importance of this
enumerated power is confirmed both by granting treaties the
preemptive force of federal law as well as expressly denying any
authority in that regard to the states.82 The preemptive strength
of treaties flows directly from Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion, which maintains that treaties have the same force as any
other U.S. law.83 The Supremacy Clause has the unique func-
tion of "transform [ing] instruments that had previously been op-
erative on [nations] as political bodies and enforceable only by
military force into instruments operative on individuals and en-
forceable in courts. 84
In many Nations, transforming a treaty into local law re-
quires domestic lawmaking institutions to undertake an addi-
tional legislative act.85 In the United States, however, most trea-
ties do not require subsequent legislation to be put into effect
and are directly applicable federal law without implementing
legislation.86 As evidenced by the Supreme Court declaration in
Foster v. Neilson in 1829,87 the Court stated that "[o]ur Constitu-
tion declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
78. Todd Steigman, Lowering the Bar: Invalidation of State Laws Affecting Foreign Af-
fairs Under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 465, 465 (2004).
79. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11-13.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1-3 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation . . . lay any imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports ... [or] enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage
in War.").
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2.
82. See supra note 79; see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age
of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 892, 900-01 (2004).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
84. Emily Deck Harrill, Exorcising the Ghost: Finding a Right and a Remedy in Article
3 6 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 55 S.C. L. REv. 569, 575 (2004) (citing
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1082, 1097 (1992)).
85. See Van Alstine, supra note 82, at 904.
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
87. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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quently, to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision.""8 As the supreme law of the
land, the power of such a "self-executing" treaty, in addition to
not requiring enacting legislation, is that any treaty trumps any
state law in existence at the time the treaty is signed, preempting
the state law, with the treaty then becoming the new law of the
land. In addition, it can be said that under the Supremacy
Clause, federal courts "have not only the right, but also the obli-
gation, to enforce the provisions of self-executing treaties."8 9
3. States and the Administration of Criminal Justice
Traditionally, the responsibility of administering criminal
justice has been a reserved power, with Alexander Hamilton stat-
ing as much in the Federalist Papers, declaring that "the ordi-
nary administration of criminal justice belongs to the states."90
Several Supreme Court cases have taken care to affirm the power
of the states over criminal justice. For instance, in Brecht v. Ab-
ramson,91 the Court stated that "[s] tates possess primary author-
ity for defining and enforcing the criminal law."'9 2 In Abbate v.
United States,9 3 the Court stated that the "responsibility for defin-
ing and prosecuting crimes" resides with the states.9 4 In addi-
tion, in the plurality opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Screws
v. United States,95 the Court stated: "Our national government is
one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the
administration of criminal justice rests with the [s] tates except as
Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has
88. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
89. Van Alstine, supra note 82, at 905-06. It should be noted that the doctrine of
self-execution does not mean that every provision of every treaty automatically creates
federal rights or obligations. As in other forms of federal law, treaty lawmakers may
expressly provide that a particular treaty is not self-executing. However, when a treaty
expresses an intent to create rights or obligations of its own accord, Article III of the
Constitution mandates that federal courts apply it as a federal rule of decision, just as
they would a statute or other form of enforceable federal law. Id. at 906-07.
90. Mark A. Correro, Get A Divorce-Become A Felon: United States V. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), 45 S. TEx. L. REv. 419, 447 (2004).
91. Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 128 (1982)).
92. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
93. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
94. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195.
95. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945).
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created offenses against the United States."96
It is the duty of states to "define criminal conduct and assign
penalties deemed appropriate in light of the goals of criminal
law that the state has accepted."9 7 This is due to the fact that
most crime is of a local nature, which gives the state an immedi-
ate interest in defining criminal conduct and enforcing criminal
statutes. The size and experience of local police departments
and state investment in penal institutions and supporting agen-
cies strengthen the states' interest in self-administration of crimi-
nal justice.
Earlier in U.S. history there had been limited federal partic-
ipation in the area of criminal law, but more recently, the fed-
eral government has increased its participation in the criminal
arena.9" There has been a considerable increase in federal legis-
lation that makes local conduct subject to federal criminal sanc-
tion, "[most] notably in areas in which existing state law already
criminalizes the same conduct."99 One study had shown that
"forty percent of the federal criminal provisions that have been
enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970. "100
Despite this trend, however, criminal law primarily remains the
domain of state governments.
C. The "Later-in-time" Rule and Charming Betsy
The "later-in-time" rule, which applies only in the context of
treaties and federal statutes, 101 holds that, in the domestic law of
the United States, treaty provisions can be overridden by directly
inconsistent subsequent statutes, which constitute "the latest ex-
pression of sovereign will. 10 2 Consequently, when a statute that
96. Screws, 325 U.S. at 109; see also Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online
Obscenity Law as an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & PoL'Y
25, 33 n.39 (2004) (citing Screws).
97. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1127, 1132 (1997).
98. See id. at 1132-33.
99. Hadi S. Al-Shathir, And Into The Maelstrom Steps The United States Supreme Court:
Licenses Are Not "Property"For Purposes Of The Mail Fraud Statute, 68 Mo. L. REv. 179, 187
(2003) (citing James E. Strazella, The Report of the ABA Task Force on the Federalization of
Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 5 (1998)).
100. Strazella, supra note 99, at 7.
101. See Jeffrey L. Green, International Law: Valdez v. State of Oklahoma and the
Application of International Law in Oklahoma, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 499, 520 (2003).
102. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 313, 313-21 (2001).
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is enacted later than a treaty at issue is inconsistent with the
treaty, the statute will prevail over the treaty to the extent of the
conflict. 10
3
The later-in-time rule dates from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. The first time the Supreme Court adopted the later-in-time
rule was in the Cherokee Tobacco Case."° 4 That case involved a
treaty of 1866 between the United States and the Cherokee Na-
tion, which released Cherokees from the obligation to pay any
U.S. tax on the sale of their farm products.1"5 However, an 1868
statute imposed a tax on spirits and tobacco "produced any-
where within the exterior boundaries of the United States,
whether the same shall be within a collection district or not. 10 6
The Supreme Court held that the 1868 statute could and did
supersede the treaty.0 7 This case settled a significant issue-a
treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Con-
gress may supersede a prior treaty. 10 8
There is an acknowledged and authoritative objection to
the application of the later-in-time rule with respect to treaties.
This long-standing doctrine arises from the landmark case of
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy ("Charming Betsy")," °9 which
holds that U.S. courts should construe a later statute to be con-
sistent with a prior treaty to the greatest extent possible.'
Charming Betsy requires that "an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."" 1 The Charming Betsy doctrine requires
that a court first examine whether the effect of a statute is to
violate international law." 2 If the court determines that the stat-
ute contradicts international law, the court should next review
the statute for ambiguity."' If there is no clear congressional
103. See Howard S. Schiffman, The Lagrand Decision: The Evolving Legal Landscape
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 42 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1099, 1132-33 (2002).
104. Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
105. Cherokee, 78 U.S. at 616.
106. An Act to Facilitate the Settlement of Paymasters' Accounts, 15 Stat. 42, 167
(1868).
107. Cherokee, 78 U.S. at 616.
108. See Vagts, supra note 102, at 315-16.
109. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 64.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 118.
112. Id. at 64.
113. Id.
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intent to violate international law, the court should exploit any
ambiguous text in the statute to avoid violating international
law.1 1 4
The application of the later-in-time rule to bar a Vienna
Convention claim from habeas review has been found to be
problematic in that the rule can undermine the purposes of the
Vienna Convention. That is, the rule prevents detainees from
litigating the issue at a crucial point in the case, especially where
there is no other established means of addressing Vienna Con-
vention violations.1 15 And so, it appears likely that despite Su-
preme Court decisions which have utilized the later-in-time rule,
especially in cases that turn on Vienna Convention claims, the
rule was not intended to be employed for the purposes of cir-
cumventing international legal obligations. The courts should
thus look at the superseding statute in the context of the Charm-
ing Betsy doctrine, utilizing Charming Betsy to assess whether that
statute can remain consistent with U.S. obligations under inter-
national law.
III. PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FOR VIENNA
CONVENTION VIOLATIONS
There have been attempts to challenge U.S. violations of the
Vienna Convention at the state, federal, and international levels.
For the purpose of demonstrating that the issue of violations of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention were not that of first im-
pression when the Avena case was brought before the ICJ, the
following cases in Part III highlight a selection of instances in
which the violation of Article 36, paragraph 1(b), was raised.
The cases are intended to be neither an indication of systematic
violations nor a general trend, nor are they considered to be ex-
ceptions to a rule of general compliance. In addition, the doc-
trine of procedural default will first be addressed as it is critical
in the later cases and in Avena.
114. See Michael F. Williams, Charming Betsy, Chevron, and the World Trade Organi-
zation: Thoughts on the Interpretive Effect of International Trade Law, 32 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 677, 694-95 (2001).
115. See Schiffman, supra note 103, at 1132.
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A. The Doctrine of Procedural Default
In 1888, the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson116 held
that if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, "the one last in date
will control the other."1 17 This "later-in-time" rule, as seen ear-
lier in Part II.C,' 8 remains prominent in U.S. law. In 1957, the
Supreme Court held in Reid v. Covert1 9 that "an Act of Congress
... is on a full parity with a treaty, and that a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the
extent of conflict renders the treaty null.'
20
The Vienna Convention came into effect in the United
States in 1969.21 In 1996, however, Congress enacted the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").122 The
AEDPA provides that a habeas petition challenging a state con-
viction is subject to a one-year period of limitation, 123 and that
the petitioner must assert his claim in state court proceedings if
he is alleging that he is being held in violation of a U.S. treaty.
1 24
If the petitioner does not follow procedure and raise the claim
in the appropriate court within the statute of limitations, the pe-
titioner defaults on that claim and is prohibited from raising it at
a later date.125 Since the AEDPA was enacted after the Vienna
Convention, it has been deemed to render the Vienna Conven-
tion null to the extent which they conflict.
12 6
The doctrine of procedural default has prevented many
valid Vienna Convention claims from being heard, simply be-
cause those claims were not raised at the appropriate time under
law. However, it will become evident that the application of this
doctrine with respect to the Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
has caused considerable conflict in the international commu-
nity.
116. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
117. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
118. See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
119. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
120. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
121. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 31(3) (b).
122. See AEDPA, supra note 9.
123. Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification
and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDozoJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 47-48 (2000).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (1994 ed. & Supp. IV).
125. Id.
126. See generally AEDPA, supra note 9.
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B. State Courts
In the following state court cases, the defendants were de-
nied relief despite clear Vienna Convention violations. Al-
though these were not habeas proceedings, they highlight the
courts' reluctance to recognize Vienna Convention rights.
At the state level, in State v. Ricardo Martinez-Rodriguez,1 27 a
New Mexico court held that the defendant did not have a private
right of action under the Vienna Convention and so did not al-
low any arguments based on international treaty violations to be
introduced. 12  The defendant further alleged that there was
prejudice from the failure of arresting officers to notify him of
his right to consular access, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph
1 (b) .12' Despite that notification under the Vienna Convention
has been found to be similar to Miranda warnings, 131 the court
in this instance found, in general, that lack of consular notifica-
tion does not result in prejudice and the court held the same
with respect to Martinez-Rodriguez.13 1
Although the district court in State v. Tuck13 2 did not deter-
mine whether the Vienna Convention created individual rights,
it affirmed the state court's decision to deny the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress on the grounds that his rights under the Vienna
Convention were violated.1 33 In State v. Ruvalcaba,13 1 the defen-
dant, a Mexican national, was not notified of his rights under the
Vienna Convention by the arresting officers.'1 5 The defendant
argued that because of the failure to notify, any evidence ob-
tained should be suppressed.' 36 In addition, he argued that be-
cause his attorney did not raise the Vienna Convention violation
he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 137 The court de-
nied both claims on the grounds of resjudicata.13 8
127. State v. Ricardo Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267 (N.M. 2001).
128. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d at 267.
129. Id.
130. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
131. See generally Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d at 267; Heath, supra note 14, at 19-20.
132. State v. Tuck, 766 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
133. See Heath, supra note 14, at 20.
134. See State v. Ruvalcaba, No. 20585, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5371 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 5, 2001).
135. Id. at *2.
136. See id.
137. See id. at *2-*3.
138. See Heath, supra note 14, at 21.
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C. Federal Courts
At the federal level, there have been several cases in which
the Vienna Convention claim was raised and the courts found
that no relief could be granted. United States v. De La Pava,139
United States v. Felix-Felix,140 and United States v. Emuegbunam,14
1
all demonstrate instances in which the defendant was granted no
remedy after claiming violations of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b).142
The most significant of the federal cases was LaGrand v.
Stewart.1 43 It was undisputed that the state of Arizona did not
notify Walter and Karl LaGrand, German nationals, of their Vi-
enna Convention rights, but the Court of Appeals dismissed
their claim on the grounds of procedural default. 14 4 The
LaGrand brothers brought their case to the ICJ, and for the first
time, the doctrine of procedural default was ruled upon by an
international court. The full facts and decision in their case will
be discussed in further detail in the next Part.
D. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court decision in Breard v. Greene14
("Breard") has been used and continues to be used for its prece-
dential value by various state and federal courts. This case
presents a validation by the Supreme Court of the doctrine of
procedural default with respect to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) of
the Vienna Convention.1 4 6 Breard provides the backdrop for the
international cases to follow and will be addressed in the next
Part.
IV. THE ROAD TO AVENA
Two cases paved the way for the ICJ decision in Avena. The
first, Breard in 1998, offers to date the only full decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court with respect to a claim of a Vienna Conven-
tion violation. The importance of this case lies not only in the
fact that it has established precedent for lower court decisions,
139. United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001).
140. United v. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2001).
141. United v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001).
142. See Heath, supra note 14, at 22-26.
143. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
144. See id. at 1261, 1277; see infra Part V.A and accompanying notes.
145. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 371 (1998).
146. See id. at 375.
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but more significantly in that it is the expression of validation of
the procedural default rule with respect to the Vienna Conven-
tion by the highest court in the land. 47 In validating the proce-
dural default rule, a chain of events was triggered that led to the
subsequent decisions of the ICJ which deemed the rule to be in
violation of international law when applied to the Vienna Con-
vention, the first being the decision of the ICJ in LaGrand, and
culminating with Avena in 2004.
A. Breard v. Greene
1. Facts of the Case
Angel Francisco Breard ("Breard"), a citizen of Paraguay,
arrived in the United States in 1986. In 1992, Breard was
charged with attempted rape and capital murder and was con-
victed on both charges and sentenced to death in the Circuit
Court of Arlington County, Virginia.' 4  The Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction on appeal in 1994.' The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 5 ° Breard then filed a writ of
habeas corpus'' in 1996 alleging that his convictions and
sentences should be overturned because, in violation of the Vi-
enna Convention, the arresting authorities failed to inform him
of his right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate.' 52 The District
Court held that Breard procedurally defaulted on his claim
when he did not raise the Vienna Convention issue in state
court, pursuant to the AEDPA, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the decision. 15
2. The Decision of the Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the request for habeas re-
lief and denied certiorari with respect to the procedural default
issue on two grounds. The first reason that the Supreme Court
put forth was that "absent a clear and express statement to the
147. See id. at 375-76.
148. See id. at 373.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. A writ of habeas corpus is "[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court,
most frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal
(habeas corpus ad subjiciendum)." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
152. See generally Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
153. See id.
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contrary, [international law has recognized that] the procedural
rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty
in that State. 1 54 The Vienna Convention, in fact, supports this
notion by stating that the rights expressed in the Convention
"shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State," so long as "said laws and regulations [allow]
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights ac-
corded under this Article are intended." '5 5 The law in the
United States is that a claim of error in a criminal proceeding
must be raised at the state court level in order to allow for a
habeas relief at a later time, and if it is not raised then it is de-
faulted.156 Since Breard failed to raise his claim in state court,
he did not properly exercise his rights under the Vienna Con-
vention, and his claim fell within the parameters of procedural
default. 157
As for the second reason, the Supreme Court maintained
that despite the fact that Article VI of the Constitution recog-
nizes treaties as the supreme law of the land, the Constitution
itself is also defined as the supreme law of the land, and it is to
the Constitution that the rules of procedural default apply.'
The Court further established the foundation for its argument
and referred to cases in which subsequent statutes preempted
treaties.1 59 The Court found that Breard's habeas claim was pre-
empted by the AEDPA and the doctrine of procedural default. 60
Angel Breard was executed on April 14, 1998.
B. Germany v. United States of America: The LaGrand Case
In June 2001, the ICJ delivered its judgment in the LaGrand
154. Id. at 375 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988); Societe Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).
155. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36(2).
156. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
157. See id. at 375-76; see also supra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
158. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
159. See id.
160. See Breard at 375-76. It should be noted that the attorneys for Breard submit-
ted his claim to the ICJ, but subsequently withdrew the claim. See Jennifer Lynne Wein-
man, The Clash Between US. Criminal Procedure and the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions: An Analysis of the International Court ofJustice Decision in the LaGrand Case, 17 AM.
U. IrNr'L L. REv. 857, 862-63 (2002) (noting that Paraguay withdrew its claim before the
ICJ after the United States issued a formal apology).
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case, 1 6 1 a complex dispute concerning the death penalty, treaty
interpretation, federalism, criminal procedure, and remedies for
the unlawful acts of States.162 The LaGrand case is particularly
monumental in that it is the first time the ICJ adjudicates the
legality of the doctrine of procedural default in the context of
Vienna Convention violations.
1. Facts of the Case
In 1984, two brothers, Walter and Karl LaGrand, were tried
and convicted in an Arizona Superior Court of first degree mur-
der, attempted first degree murder, attempted armed robbery,
and two counts of kidnapping. 163 They were each sentenced to
death for the first degree murder charge. 164 The LaGrand
brothers were born in Germany and moved with their mother to
the United States in 1967. They remained German nationals at
all times, never acquiring U.S. citizenship. 165
From the time of the LaGrands' arrests and through their
convictions and appeals, they were never informed of their
rights under the Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Con-
vention.1 6 6 In 1992, after learning of their rights from outside
sources, and not from Arizona authorities, the LaGrand brothers
informed the German consulate of their case. 16 7 From 1992
through 1999 the German Consulate General in Los Angeles vis-
ited the LaGrands in prison and assisted in the investigation of
their case. 68 In a third set of legal proceedings, the LaGrands
filed applications for writs of habeas corpus169 in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Arizona with the hope
that their convictions, or at least their death sentences, would be
set aside. 170 Their applications were denied and the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, due to the fact that
the doctrine of procedural default prohibited the LaGrands
from raising the Vienna Convention violation on habeas corpus
161. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
162. See Brook, supra note 66, at 575.
163. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 475, 14.
164. See id.
165. See id. 13.
166. See id. 15.
167. See id. 22.
168. See id.
169. See id. 23.
170. See id.
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review in federal courts because they had not raised the claim of
violation in state proceedings.
171
On February 24, 1999, Karl LaGrand was executed by lethal
injection. 172 Only hours before Walter's scheduled execution,
the government of Germany filed a claim before the ICJ. 173 The
ICJ then issued a provisional measure, which called upon the
United States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Walter LaGrand is not executed."1 74 Germany then filed a claim
with the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting a stay of execution
based on the ICJ provisional order.1 75 The United States Su-
preme Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction and re-
jected a request for a stay of execution for Walter LaGrand 176
after which he was summarily executed by asphyxiation in an Ari-
zona gas chamber.1
77
2. The Decision of the ICJ
Although the deaths of the LaGrand brothers would render
the issues in this case moot under U.S. domestic law, Germany
could still pursue a claim under international law for the harm
that it suffered due to the Vienna Convention violation, and so it
brought suit against the United States in the ICJ.1 78 The ICJ de-
cision in the LaGrand case delineated U.S. obligations under the
Vienna Convention. The ICJ had two main holdings. The first
was that "orders on provisional measures under Article 41 [of
the ICJ Statute] have binding effect" in international law.1 79 The
United States would, therefore, have a legal duty to comply with
the provisional measure of the ICJ to use any means within its
capabilities to stay the execution of a foreign national.' 80
The second holding was that the United States was obli-
gated, in cases of conviction and death sentences obtained in
violation of the Vienna Convention, to "allow review and recon-
sideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of
171. See id.
172. See id. 29.
173. See id. 30.
174. See id. 1 32.
175. See id. 33.
176. See generally Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
177. See Brook, supra note 66, at 578.
178. See id.
179. See LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 506, 109 (June 27).
180. See Brook, supra note 48, at 578.
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the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention[,]''
thereby precluding a situation of procedural default. While leav-
ing the means of compliance to the United States, the U.S. gov-
ernment may not invoke its own governmental structure to skirt
international law, and must also manage to balance its interna-
tional obligations with its own federal system. 182
IV. THE AVENA JUDGMENT
The Avena case is the latest international judicial decision
determining the validity of the procedural default rule with re-
spect to the Vienna Convention."s ' As in the previous cases of
Breard and LaGrand, the facts will first be presented followed by
the ICJ's decision and rationale. This Part will conclude with the
recommendation of the Court, after it finds other suggested
methods to be insufficient and inapplicable.
A. Facts of the Case
On January 9, 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United
States for alleged breaches of the Vienna Convention with re-
spect to a certain number of Mexican nationals who had been
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in criminal proceedings
in the United States. 84 The claim originally included fifty-four
persons, but was later adjusted to include just fifty-two, and then
limited further to fifty-one. 185 Mexico also requested that the
ICJ order the United States to stay all executions pending a final
decision of the Court, and the Court issued such order on Febru-
ary 5, 2003.186
On March 31, 2004, the ICJ delivered its final, unappealable
and binding judgment in Avena, finding by fourteen votes to one
that the United States breached its obligations under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention. 187
181. See id. at 578-79.
182. See id. at 579.
183. See generally Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
184. See ICJ Press Release, supra note 6.
185. See id. The ICJ concluded that Mexico failed to prove that the United States
violated its obligations under the Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention
with respect to one claimant, Mr. Ram6n Salcido Boj6rquez, and elected to comment
upon it no further. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 44-45, 66.
186. See ICJ Press Release, supra note 6.
187. See id.
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B. The Decision and Rationale of the ICJ
To more adequately address the issue of procedural default,
the ICJ focused its attentions on a major point at issue between
Mexico and the United States.188 The issue related to the defini-
tion of the term "without delay" in paragraph 1 (b) so as to deter-
mine at what point the obligations of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b)
arise. 189 The meaning of the expression "without delay" lies at
the heart of the discussion of whether the doctrine of procedu-
ral default with respect to the Vienna Convention is valid, be-
cause if, in fact, there had not been a delay in notification of the
detainees, then the doctrine of procedural default would not
have applied to them at all. It is, therefore, the delay in notifica-
tion that resulted in the violation of the detainees rights under
the Vienna Convention.
The Court noted that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), contains
three separate but interrelated elements with respect to the term
"without delay": (1) the right of the individual concerned to be
informed without delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph
1(b); (2) the right of the consular post to be notified without
delay of the individual's detention, if he so requests; and (3) the
obligation of the receiving State to forward without delay any
communication addressed to the consular post by the detained
person.190
Mexico and the United States have diverging views about
the meaning of "without delay." Mexico contends that it re-
quires "unqualified immediacy" and that "consular notification
... must occur immediately upon detention and prior to any
interrogation of the foreign detainee."'' 1 The United States, on
the other hand, interprets "without delay" to mean that "there
should be no deliberate delay" and that the necessary notifica-
tion should be issued "as soon as reasonably possible under the
188. Avena, 2004 I.CJ. at 40, 52. In fact, there were two major points at issue.
The first was the question of the nationality of the Mexicans concerned. The United
States claimed that some of the fifty-two Mexican nationals had dual citizenship in Mex-
ico and the United States. The Court found that since the United States did not prove
their claim, they were obligated to adhere to the obligations set forth in Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), and provide the fifty-two Mexican nationals with consular information.
See ICJ Press Release, supra note 6. For the purposes of this Article, however, the defini-
tion of the terms "without delay" will be the focus.
189. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 40, 1 51.
190. See id. at 43, 61.
191. See id. at 47, 78.
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circumstances." 192
In noting that the Vienna Convention does, in fact, define
certain terms used in the Convention and that no definition was
given of the phrase "without delay,"19 the Court found that the
phrase does not invoke immediacy, but rather, detaining author-
ities have the duty to inform a detainee of his Vienna Conven-
tion rights "once it is realized that the person is a foreign na-
tional, or once there are grounds to think that the person is
probably a foreign national."194
The ICJ found that by applying the procedural default rule
in the manner currently practiced, "the defendant is effectively
barred from raising the issue of the violation of his rights under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and is limited in seeking
the vindication of his rights under the United States Constitu-
tion. "195 In the Avena decision the ICJ essentially affirmed its
decision in the LaGrand case, contending that its previous deci-
sion is equally valid in the present case. Citing LaGrand, the
Court stated:
In itself, the [procedural default] rule does not violate Article
36 of the Vienna Convention. The problem arises when the
procedural default rule does not allow the detained individ-
ual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in
reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that
the competent national authorities failed to comply with their
obligation to provide the requisite consular information
'without delay,' thus preventing the person from seeking and
obtaining consular assistance from the sending State.19 6
On these grounds, the ICJ in Avena observed that "the pro-
cedural default rule prevented counsel for the LaGrands to ef-
fectively challenge [the LaGrands'] convictions and sentences
192. See id. at 47, 1 81.
193. See id. at 48, 84.
194. See id. at 43, 49, 62, 88. It should be noted that the booklet issued by the
United States Department of State, entitled Consular Notification and Access: Instructions
for Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in
the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them, has been distributed to
federal, state and local authorities so as to advance adherence to Article 36 of the Vi-
enna Convention. This booklet notes that "most, but not all, persons born outside the
United States are not [citizens]."
195. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 63, 134.
196. Id. at 57, 112 (citing Lagrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27)).
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other than on United States constitutional grounds. 19 7 The
Court went on to state that this assertion was equally relevant in
the Avena case, where Mexican nationals were placed in the
same situation. 19 The ICJ affirmatively held that the application
of the procedural default rule effectively prevents "full effect
[from being] given to the purposes for which the rights ac-
corded under [Article 36, paragraph 1(b),] are intended,"1 99
pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2.
In addition to the ICJ's landmark decision on procedural
default, the Court's clarification of the term "without delay" is
equally significant in that it defines the requirements of States
Parties to the Vienna Convention with respect to implementing
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). From this decision there is a refer-
ence point to which governments can turn to determine if they
are acting in accordance with the intent of the treaty. This defi-
nition will also prove crucial to the implementation of remedies,
as well as to the understanding of the recourse that the ICJ out-
lined in Avena.
C. Solutions Presented in Avena
The Government of Mexico submitted to the ICJ that the
proper remedy for the violation by the United States of the Vi-
enna Convention rights of the Mexican nationals should be, by
way of restitutio in integrum, annulment of the convictions and
sentences of all the Mexican nationals.2"' The ICJ rejected this
assertion.20 1 The Court examined other measures and discussed
their acceptability.
1. Clemency
Although the ICJ acknowledged the function of clemency in
the administration of criminal justice in the United States, and
that it is the "historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of jus-
tice where judicial process has been exhausted,"2"2 the Court
found that clemency did not qualify as an appropriate means for
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 57, 113.
200. See id. at 58, 117.
201. See id. at 70, 152.
202. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993).
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achieving effective review of the cases. 2° 3 The Court did note,
however, that clemency could supplement judicial "review and
reconsideration," as will be discussed below. 20 4 This determina-
tion is significant in that in the past, the U.S. Government as well
as localities have looked to clemency as their method of review
and reconsideration to alleviate alleged Vienna Convention vio-
lations, and now an alternative technique must be found to sup-
plant their former method.
2. Adequate Assurances
The government of Mexico requested of the Court to rule
that the United States provide "appropriate guarantees and as-
surances that it shall take measures sufficient to achieve in-
creased compliance with Article 36(1)," because the measures
that the United States has already taken to implement the Vi-
enna Convention have proven ineffective in light of the current
case. 2 5 The Court denied this request, recognizing that there is
no evidence to indicate a "regular and continuing" pattern of
breach and that the United States has made efforts to implement
the Vienna Convention. 20 6 The ICJ had also addressed the issue
of request for assurances in LaGrand, stating:
If a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refers
to substantial activities which it is carrying out in order to
achieve compliance with certain obligations under a treaty,
then this expresses a commitment to follow through with the
efforts in this regard. The programme in question certainly
cannot provide an assurance that there will never again be a
failure by the United States to observe the obligations of noti-
fication under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. But no
State could give such a guarantee and Germany does not seek
it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by
the United States to ensure implementation of the specific
measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Ar-
203. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 66, 142-43.
204. See id. For a more detailed analysis of "review and reconsideration," see infra
Part IV.C.3.
205. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 67, 144-45.
206. See id. at 68, 149. It should be noted that the Court mentions paragraph 64
of its decision, which discusses some the efforts of some jurisdictions to provide Vienna
Convention information in parallel with the reading of Miranda rights. This Article
discusses in a later section how, though this may be considered a substantial effort on
the part of the Court, it is, in fact, insufficient.
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ticle 36, paragraph l(b), must be regarded as meeting Ger-
many's request for a general assurance of non-repetition.
207
The Court held that what applied in LaGrand also applied
in the Avena case. 20
8
3. Review and Reconsideration
As had already been in addressed in LaGrand, in the event
that breaches of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) should occur:
[I] t would be incumbent on the United States to allow review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence [of the
claimants] by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out
in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the
United States. 20
9
The ICJ in Avena remained faithful to the review and recon-
sideration criteria set forth in LaGrand insofar as it stated that
the process of review and reconsideration, of both the convic-
tion and sentence, should take into account the violation of the
rights established by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), as well as ensure
that the breach and the possible prejudice caused by the breach
be thoroughly examined.210
In discussing review and reconsideration, the ICJ also found
that the due process rights under U.S. constitutional law were
not relevant to Vienna Convention claims, in that Article 36, par-
agraph 1 (b) establishes treaty rights and does not relate to a
right to due process.211 And so, in a case of a Vienna Conven-
tion violation, the defendant's claim does not concern any dam-
age to a right necessary to experience a fair trial, but rather sim-
ply involves the infringement of treaty rights. The ICJ, there-
fore, takes note that it is imperative in the process of review and
reconsideration for there to exist a procedure "which guarantees
that full weight is given to the violation of rights set forth in the
Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such
review and reconsideration."21 2
207. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.CJ. 466, 512-13, 124 (June 27).
208. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 69, 150.
209. LaGrand, 2001 I.CJ. at 513, 1 125.
210. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65, 138 (citing LaGrand, 2001 I.CJ. at 514-17, 128).
211. Id. at 65, 139.
212. See id.; see also, Sean D. Murphy, ed., ICJ Decision Regarding Mexicans on Death
Row in United States, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 364, 368 (2004).
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICJ DECISION IN AVENA
The implications of the Avena case on any subsequent ac-
tion to be taken are outlined in this Part, beginning with a brief
mention of how it appears the Courts in the Breard, LaGrand,
and Avena cases view the obligations of States. This is crucial in
that knowledge of States' obligations is necessary for understand-
ing future implementation mechanisms. The next two sections
analyze the ability of the states to comply with the ICJ decision in
Avena in light of the Supreme Court decision in Breard. Two
state court cases demonstrate how the Avena decision will cause
courts across the United States to part ways in deciding whether
to follow the ICJ or the Supreme Court when rendering deci-
sions.
A. The Obligations of States: Breard, LaGrand, and Avena
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Breard sheds
some light on the ways in which the Supreme Court perceives its
obligations with respect to the federal government's interna-
tional agreements. Breard is the precursor to the LaGrand and
Avena cases. The fundamental issue and premise of all three-
the validity or applicability of the procedural default rule with
respect to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) -was subsequently found
by the ICJ to be against international law.113 It is, therefore, im-
perative that the difficult issues of the Breard case are under-
stood, as they lay the foundation for the subsequent two cases.
The Supreme Court in Breard, while not discounting its in-
ternational obligations, asserted that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b),
of the Vienna Convention will only apply so long as those rights
are invoked within the procedural framework of the prosecuting
state, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2. The Court makes no
mention of the prosecuting state's insufficiency in implementing
Article 36, and, therefore, does not provide a real solution for
foreign Nations, such as Paraguay in that instance, who object to
the ill-treatment of their citizens on U.S. soil.2 14
It should be noted that while the Supreme Court did cite
Article 36, paragraph 2, which states that the "laws and regula-
tions [of the receiving State] must enable full effect to be given
213. See Murphy, supra note 212, at 368.
214. See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article
are intended[]" 1 5 the Court made no mention of how the Arti-
cle was, or in this case was not, given full effect in the case of
Breard. It only focused on how Breard defaulted on his rights. It
may be inferred that this decision is asserting the proposition
that the international obligations of the United States under the
Vienna Convention are only relevant so long as they are con-
ducted within U.S. legal procedure, and that U.S. legal proce-
dure remains paramount above all else, including the specific
terms of the treaty the federal government signed.
The LaGrand and Avena cases offer a more noble mention
of the responsibilities of States with respect to their international
treaty obligations. These cases stand for the proposition, in find-
ing the doctrine of procedural default to be against interna-
tional law in instances where the Vienna Convention has not
been applied, that it is simply not enough to sign an agreement
without putting the mechanisms in place to ensure that the
agreement is given proper force. By finding the doctrine of pro-
cedural default to be in violation of international law, conse-
quently preventing full effect to be given to the terms of the Vi-
enna Convention, the ICJ decisions serve as an admonition of
the Supreme Court in its ruling that the doctrine of procedural
default can essentially sever a claim based on the violation of the
Vienna Convention's terms.
The ICJ and the Supreme Court part ways in their determi-
nation of international obligations. The Supreme Court does
not deny its international obligations, in general, but ultimately
uses its own laws to place itself outside the scope of international
law. The ICJ, however, has concluded that domestic law may in-
deed be relevant, so long as it does not impede the treaty obliga-
tions that the United States has taken upon itself.
B. Are the States Bound by Breard?
The case of Valdez v. State of Oklahoma in 2002,16 in which
the court relied on Breard, is significant in that it was the first
state court to address Article 36 issues after the LaGrand case. As
it is similar to the dilemma facing courts today after Avena, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("Oklahoma Court")
215. See id.
216. See generally Valdez v. Okla., 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
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presented the issue as whether it must follow the precedent of
the ICJ or the U.S. Supreme Court. 21 7 The Oklahoma Court
concluded that the Breard decision gave it no option, in light of
the fact that following the ICJ decision in LaGrand would inter-
fere with the federal government's power in foreign affairs and
would violate the Constitution.1
Nonetheless, Breard should be inapplicable on the following
grounds. As mentioned previously,219 the Supreme Court in
Breard never actually resolved the issue of whether the federal
procedural default laws actually gave effect to Article 36. Citing
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, which states
that the right to consular access and notification "shall be exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State" provided that those laws give "full effect .. . to the pur-
poses for the which the rights accorded ... are intended[,] 221
the Supreme Court asserted that, with respect to this paragraph,
the forum state's rules of procedure govern the implementation
of the Vienna Convention in that state.2 1 However, the Su-
preme Court did not determine whether the federal procedural
default rule did actually give "full effect" to Article 36, paragraph
1 (b). This determination was crucial in that it lies at the heart of
whether the LaGrand brothers were denied their rights, and
whether, in fact, the law enforcement agents complied with the
Vienna Convention in that case.22 2
It is also essential to note that a decision of the Supreme
Court to deny certiorari carries much less weight than if the Su-
preme Court actually had heard the case. In Teague v. Lane in
1989,223 the Supreme Court held that petitioners cannot "bene-
fit from the rule announced" in a case denying certiorari.224 In
addition, denials of certiorari do not adjudicate the merits of a
particular case and do not carry precedential value. 225 The
217. See Green, supra note 101, at 525.
218. See id. (citing Valdez, 46 P.3d at 706). It is interesting to note that the
Oklahoma Court reversed itself in that regard with its decision of May 13, 2004.
219. See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes.
220. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
221. See id. at 375-76.
222. Green, supra note 101, at 525.
223. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
224. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.
225. Id. (citing Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950);
United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)).
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Breard decision was a denial of certiorari and should, therefore,
not be relied upon by courts faced with a similar question.
In conclusion, despite the fact that courts have already
looked to Breard as precedent for decisions in their own cases,
the use of Breard as precedent fails on two important counts.
The first is that Breard provided neither a resolution of the de-
tainee's claim of denial of rights, nor an indication that the pro-
vision of full effect in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Con-
vention was, in fact, implemented. 226 The second and most im-
portant is that the Supreme Court decision was a denial of
certiorari and not a decision on the merits. Pursuant to Teague,
a court cannot rely upon such a decision in making a determina-
tion in a case before it.
C. The Binding Effect of the ICJ Decision on the United States
In addition to ratifying the Vienna Convention in 1969, the
United States also signed the Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes ("Optional Protocol"),227
thereby rendering the Optional Protocol the "Supreme Law of
the Land." The United States was an instrumental participant in
drafting the Optional Protocol, which provides that States may
bring disputes arising under the Vienna Convention to the ICJ
for adjudication and a binding resolution.22 The United States
was the first country to bring a case under the Optional Protocol
during the Iranian hostage crisis. 220 Since that time the U.S. gov-
ernment has invariably looked to the ICJ for binding decisions
on international treaty disputes. 30
Additionally, Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ addresses
the binding effect of ICJ decisions, stating that "[t] he decision of
226. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
227. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, done
Apr. 24, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. The United States has since withdrawn
from the Optional Protocol.
228. Torres v. Okla., No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(Chapel, J., concurring).
229. Id. See also Curtis Bradley, Lori Fisler Damrosch, and Martin Flaherty, Medellin
v. Dretke: A Debate, 43 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 677 (2005).
230. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 2 (Chapel, J., concurring); see Philip V.
Tisne, The ICJ and Municipal Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and Lagrand Deci-
sions in U.S. Courts, 29 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 865, 906-914 (2006) (arguing that ICJ deci-
sions rendered pursuant to Optional Protocol only operate in international law and are
not decisions of municipal law that are binding in States' courts).
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the Court has no binding force except between the parties and
in respect of that particular case. "231 It follows that ajudgement
of the ICJ is determinative as between the parties in a case. It
should be noted here, however, that in March 2005, the United
States withdrew from the Optional Protocol by notifying the
United Nations, which is the depositary for the Optional Proto-
col to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 212 At a
State Department briefing of March 10, 2005, a spokesman
stated that when the United States signed the Optional Protocol
"it [was] not anticipated that.., the optional protocol would be
used to review cases of domestic criminal law."'23 3 Nonetheless,
despite the United States' withdrawal in March, the withdrawal is
not retroactive to the Avena decision since the United States was
party to the Optional Protocol at that time. The State Depart-
ment spokesman further stated that "in recognition of the op-
tional protocol and [United States'] international commitments
.... the United States will comply with the judgment of the [ICJ
in the Avena case] ."234 Therefore, pursuant to Article 59 and the
Optional Protocol, the decision of the ICJ in Avena remains
binding on the United States.
D. Cases
The following two cases demonstrate the divide in the state
judicial decisions across the United States, and the dilemma fac-
ing courts after Avena. The first case offers a reconciliation of
the Avena decision with its own state judicial decision. In the
second case, the Court of Appeals acknowledges the rights of the
defendant under the Vienna Convention, but finds itself bound
to the precedent of the Supreme Court in Breard. That case is
being reviewed, however, and so a determination is currently
pending.
231. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
232. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2005, at A01.
233. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: General
International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law: U.S. Strategy for Responding to ICJ's Avena Deci-
sion, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 490 (John R. Crook ed., 2005).
234. Id.
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1. Torres v. Oklahoma: A Stay of Execution and a First Step
Since Avena, the international legal community has looked
toward the United States to see what its next step will be. The
urgency and importance mounted as the first of the Mexican
nationals, Osbaldo Torres, was set to be executed on May 18,
2004, in Oklahoma. 235 Torres received a stay of his execution by
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("Oklahoma Court")
in a landmark decision that was a case of first impression in the
Oklahoma judicial system as well as in any other U.S. court.2 6
In this case, the Oklahoma Court, in following the forth-
coming chain of reasoning, found that the individual states were
and had been under an obligation to uphold the Vienna Con-
vention, and in not doing so, they, thereby violated the rights of
the defendants. 237 The court rendered its decision while depart-
ing from any suggestion that the ICJ has jurisdiction over a state
court in Oklahoma.238
Justice Chapel of the Oklahoma Court looked to the terms
of the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol, as well as
to the U.S. Constitution as the basis for his decision. 239 He
found that the United States was bound to uphold the decision
of the ICJ based on U.S. acceptance of the terms of the Optional
Protocol, which provides that the ICJ is "the forum for resolution
of disputes under the Vienna Convention."24 ° In addition, the
Oklahoma Court found the Vienna Convention to be directly
binding on the states in light of the Supremacy Clause and its
treaty provision, and asserted that there has been no question as
to whether state courts have considered the Vienna Convention
binding on them.2 4 1 In simplest terms, the U.S. federal govern-
ment legally and voluntarily entered into a treaty with other Na-
tions. In so doing, the United States became bound by the terms
of the treaty, and by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and the Op-
tional Protocol, Oklahoma must give effect to that treaty. 24 2
235. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at I (order granting stay of execution and
remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
236. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 1 (Chapel, J., concurring).
237. See id. at 12.
238. See generally Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
239. See id. at 2; see also supra note 230 and accompanying text.
240. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 5 (Chapel, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 3-4.
242. Id. at 5.
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The Oklahoma Court found that Torres's Vienna Conven-
tion claim "was generated by the State of Oklahoma's initial fail-
ure to comply with the treaty." 243 The Oklahoma Court also rec-
ognized that, although under normal circumstances Torres's
claim would be procedurally barred, the Avena decision holds
that applying the procedural bar violates the Convention if that
bar "prevents the Vienna Convention claim from being
heard. '244 The Oklahoma Court then acknowledged that it is
bound to review Torres's conviction "without recourse to the
procedural bar" in order to give full effect to Avena. 24 5
Thereafter, to reach its decision, the Oklahoma Court ap-
plied a three-prong test that other courts have used, to deter-
mine prejudice: (1) the defendant did not know that he had a
right to contact his consulate for assistance; (2) he would have
availed himself of the right had he known of it; and (3) it was
likely that the consulate would have assisted the defendant.246
Finding that Torres's claim satisfied all three prongs, the
Oklahoma Court concluded that the violation of Torres's Vi-
enna Convention rights contributed to ineffective assistance of
counsel, that the jury did not hear sufficient evidence, and that
the result of the original trial was unreliable.247
Thus, while not formally submitting itself to the jurisdiction
of the ICJ, the Oklahoma Court determined that its decision
complied with the requirements of review and reconsideration
set forth in Avena.24" The Oklahoma Court permitted the ren-
dering of that decision by disregarding that the claim was proce-
durally barred so as to give full effect to the Vienna Convention
and Avena.
2. Medellin v. Dretke
Not all cases after Avena have resulted in an immediate rec-
onciliation of the ICJjudgment with U.S. law. In the decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit")
243. Id. at 8.
244. Id. at 7-8.
245. Id. at 8.
246. Id. at 9.
247. Id. at 12.
248. Id.
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in the case of Medellin v. Dretke,249 the justices of the denied the
petitioner-defendant a certificate of appealability from a denial
of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 250 The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas held thatJos6 Ernesto Medel-
lin's Vienna Convention claim was barred by procedural de-
fault.25 1 The Fifth Circuit supported the petitioner's argument
that Texas's application of the procedural default rule in this
case violated the Vienna Convention, while recognizing the peti-
tioner's reliance on the decision in LaGrand as well as noting the
subsequent ICJ affirmation of its decision in Avena.2 1 2 The
Court nonetheless found that it could not ignore the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruling in Breard, and that ordinary procedural de-
fault rules can bar Vienna Convention claims in light of the
AEDPA.253
In addition, the Court found that Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention did not create individually enforceable rights.25 4
The petitioner, in making his assertion, relied on the LaGrand
decision in which the ICJ held that Article 36 did, in fact, create
individual rights. 255 The Fifth Circuit, however, relied on a prior
decision of its own Court and held to the contrary. 25 6 The Fifth
Circuit maintained that, the decision in LaGrand notwithstand-
ing, it is bound to apply the precedent-setting decision of its own
Court "until either the Court sitting en banc or the Supreme
Court say otherwise. 25 7 Since, it has previously been held that
only the Supreme Court may overrule its own decision,25 only a
new Supreme Court decision could provide a different outcome.
249. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1302
(2004) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
250. Id. at 281.
251. Id. at 279.
252. Id. at 279-80.
253. Id. at 280.
254. Id. at 279.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 280 ("'The sum of [petitioner's] arguments fails to lead to an ineluc-
table conclusion that Article 36 creates judicially enforceable rights of consultation be-
tween a detained foreign national and his consular office. Thus, the presumption
against such rights ought to be conclusive.'") (quoting United States v. Jimenez-Nava,
243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001).
257. Id.
258. See id. ("'If a precedent of [the Supreme Court] has direct application in a
case .... the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
this Court the prerogative of overruling it own decisions.'") (quoting Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
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On December 10, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Medellin v. Dretke.25 9 More than two
months after certiorari was granted and a month before oral ar-
gument in the case, President Bush issued a memorandum that
stated the United States would discharge its international obliga-
tions under the Avena judgment by "having [s] tate courts give
effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with general principles
of comity in cases filed by the fifty-one Mexican nationals ad-
dressed in that decision. '"260
Four days before the Supreme Court was to hear the oral
arguments in Medellin's case, Medellin, relying on the memo-
randum of President Bush, thereafter filed a state application for
a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals. 261 The Supreme Court held that the "state proceeding
may provide Medellin with the review and reconsideration of his
Vienna Convention claim that the ICJ required," the same review
and reconsideration that Medellin was seeking in the Supreme
Court proceeding. In addition, for the Supreme Court to hear
Medellin's case, Medellin would have to show that he "exhausted
all available state court remedies. '262 Furthermore, in order to
appeal a denial of habeas relief to a federal court, the petitioner
must make a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional
right. ' 263 The Court, therefore, dismissed Medellin's writ of cer-
tiorari "as improvidently granted. 264
Since Medellin's claim before the Court turned on a treaty-
based right, his only solution was to pursue his claim in the
Texas state courts.2 6 5 The oral argument was heard in the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals on September 14, 2005266 and the
outcome of that proceeding is currently pending.26
7
259. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
260. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to U.S. Attorney General
(Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
261. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089.
262. Id. at 2092.
263. Id. at 2091 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2) (1996)); see also Bradley et al., supra
note 229, at 680.
264. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2088.
265. Bradley et al., supra note 229, at 680.
266. The International Justice Project, http://www.internationationaljusticeproject.org
(last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
267. Id.
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VII. REMEDIES AFTER AVENA
That detainees can be procedurally barred from asserting
rights that they were unaware they had, due to the inaction of
law enforcement officers whose obligation it is to inform them of
those rights, is unjust and causes the United States to fall terribly
short of achieving compliance with the Vienna Convention. If
the ICJ is seeking more concerted efforts on the part of the
United States to ensure the implementation of the Vienna Con-
vention in the future, practical means must be found in which
the states can more actively comply with their treaty obligations
in order to prevent future instances of treaty violations.
Part VII opens with establishing the requirement that a rem-
edy be found, despite that the text of the Vienna Convention
itself does not provide as such. The section following talks about
the concept of reciprocity among Nations as an incentive for
compliance and the discounting of that notion as insufficient.
This Part continues with a discussion of good faith and con-
cludes with examples of good faith in practice.
A. The Requirement of Recourse
Notwithstanding the many scholarly articles and cases that
alert the legal community to the Vienna Convention and its im-
plications, Article 36 violations continue to occur.2 6 8 Often-
times, even judges and lawyers are not aware of the Vienna Con-
vention provisions, and unless there is some avenue through
which the treaty is brought to the attention of the law enforce-
ment community, foreign nationals will continue to make the
same unsuccessful arguments for years to come with little re-
course at their disposal.269
In cases of Vienna Convention violations, the United States
has frequently found itself in breach of its obligations because
the courts have denied relief, while the executive and legislative
branches do not have a direct role in the matter, and, therefore,
have little or no effect. The only involvement by the executive in
granting relief would occur in cases where the President, in fed-
eral-level prosecutions, or a governor, in state-level prosecutions,
affords a remedy by means of sentence commutation, pardon, or
268. Id. at 586.
269. Id. at 586-87.
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clemency. 270 Although lack of executive and legislative involve-
ment may provide an explanation for the challenges the United
States faces in upholding the Vienna Convention, as indicated in
the ILC Articles, however, the explanation is not a valid justifica-
tion. Pursuant to the ILC Articles, all organs of the United
States, be they the executive, legislative, or judicial, share equal
responsibility for the wrongful acts of the State. 27 1 All branches
are, therefore, responsible for finding an equitable solution for
the wronged parties in the Avena case.
Since the United States is generally aware of its treaty obliga-
tions, at issue in this instance is not whether the United States
deems itself to be obligated under the Vienna Convention, but
how those obligations can be fulfilled.
As the Vienna Convention creates a right, as indicated by
the ICJ, then, to be sure, there must also be a remedy for breach.
Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that
principle in 1803, declaring in Marbury v. Madison27 2 that
"[w] here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 27 ChiefJustice
Marshall went further to state that "[t]he government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high
appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for violation of a
vested legal right. 274 And so, even if the text of Article 36 does
not provide a definitive remedy, "courts have rarely, if ever, felt
themselves so restrained by technical rules that they could not
find some remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether
done by government or by individual persons, that violated natu-
ral justice."2 75 In establishing that there is a right created under
the Vienna Convention, then, in accordance with U.S. tradition,
a remedy for the violation must also exist.
B. The Advancement and Failure of the Argument for Reciprocity
Thomas Paine once said that "[h] e that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if
270. Quigley, supra note 16, at 50-51 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
271. See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
272. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
273. Harrill, supra note 84, at 587 (citing Marbuy, 5 U.S. at 163).
274. Marbuiy, 5 U.S. at 163.
275. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910).
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he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to
himself."276 The idea embodied in those words has formed the
foundation for an argument against non-compliance.
The United States has historically conducted diplomatic in-
teractions and entered into treaty-based relationships with other
States. U.S. leaders have, therefore, valued the stability of expec-
tations created by the norms of the law of treaties.277 Treaty en-
forcement has traditionally been based upon the rule of reci-
procity-that a State complies with a treaty to guarantee other
States' compliance with the treaty. Reciprocity effectively en-
sures "the observance of justice and good faith, in [the] inter-
course [that] frequently occur[s] between two or more indepen-
dent [S] tates, and the individuals belonging to each."271
The principle of reciprocity has served as the premise for
arguments that U.S. non-compliance with Article 36 would be
detrimental to U.S. citizens abroad. 271 Several courts have been
concerned that there may be negative consequences for U.S. citi-
zens if U.S. courts do not heed the Vienna Convention.2"' The
Oklahoma Court in the Torres decision averred that treaty viola-
tions undermine not only the "Law of the Land," but also inter-
national law where reciprocity is critical. 21  The Oklahoma
Court argued that officials in foreign countries would be more
likely to disregard their treaty obligations when U.S. citizens are
in custody if U.S. officials continue to ignore the requirements
of Article 36.282
As evidenced by the Iranian hostage crisis,28 3 the United
States is deeply concerned with the safety of U.S. citizens abroad
and the protection that Article 36 affords them. However, al-
though this reason has been advanced as an incentive for states
276. Harrill, supra note 84, at 590 (2004) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655, 688 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and quoting THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 588 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945)).
277. SeeJohn E. Noyes, American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders, and General Interna-
tional Law, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 293, 300 (2004).
278. Michael Fleishman, Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in
Defense of its Foreign Nationals in United States Death Penalty Cases, 20 AIz.J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 359, 362 (2003) (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347, 2351-53 (1991)).
279. See Green, supra note 101, at 534.
280. Id.
281. See Tortes, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 4 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004).
282. See id.
283. See supra Introduction and accompanying notes.
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to properly implement the Vienna Convention and redress viola-
tions, this fact alone has not sufficiently motivated the authori-
ties to take action to provide an adequate remedy. The Iranian
hostage crisis occurred in 1979, and since that time, Vienna Con-
vention violations have persisted, as evidenced by Breard,
LaGrand, and Avena, which commenced a long while after. To
find a truly successful remedy, other avenues must be explored.
C. The Doctrine of Good Faith
Although international law is binding on the individual
states under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, current practice
in states across the country seems to suggest that states find that
to be otherwise. And so, the question of federal government in-
tervention in state action raises rather interesting issues.
On the one hand, ICJ decisions cannot cause decisions of
domestic U.S. courts to simply be overturned. The only mecha-
nism for enforcement in the system of the ICJ that is provided
for in the U.N. Charter is by way of the U.N. Security Council
and solely at its discretion.284 In addition, although the Vienna
Convention and its Optional Protocol are binding on the states
under the Supremacy Clause, in the absence of new federal legis-
lation, the federal government cannot compel states to apply the
ICJ decision. 285 However, this does not mean that states need
not comply, but rather that the federal government does not
have the power at present to force them to do so without new
legislation. On the other hand, even if states wished to comply
with the ICJ decision in Avena, it has been contended that the
decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be ignored by deferring
to a court outside of the United States. The solution to this di-
lemma cannot be found in statute, but rather in the doctrine of
good faith,2 8 6 which is especially important in international rela-
tions.
When Nations sign treaties, they do so with the good faith
belief that the other signatories will uphold their obligations.
This notion was considered so important that it was included in
the VCLT as a reminder to States. Article 26 of the VCLT states
284. See Bradley, et al., supra note 229, at 681.
285. See supra Part VI and accompanying notes.
286. See generally H.K Lficke, GOOD FAITH AND CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE, in Es-
SAYS ON CONTRACT ch.5 (Paul D. Finn ed., 1987).
REVISITING MIRANDA AFTER AVENA
that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith. 28 7
In the circumstances of Avena, by not informing the Mexi-
can nationals of their Vienna Convention rights and later claim-
ing that those rights have defaulted on procedural grounds was
not the best display of good faith by the United States in fulfil-
ling its treaty obligations. Even if it were the case that the
AEDPA prevents a claim from being heard again, and that an ICJ
decision does not have equal weight to a U.S. Supreme Court
decision or that the Avena ruling cannot be imposed on the state
courts, the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol remain
binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause, and so their
terms must be respected.
As an exercise in good faith, it may be plausible for state
courts to deem the ICJ decision to be persuasive in making their
decisions, looking to the ICJ for guidance in fulfilling their own
treaty obligations, while at the same time not necessarily formally
deeming the decision to be controlling in their courts, as seen in
the case of Torres v. Oklahoma,288 so as not to conflict with the
U.S. Supreme Court.28 9 Although this may appear contradictory
and not within the complete expectations of the international
community, by doing so, the courts would be satisfying the terms
of the Optional Protocol as well as adhering to their own treaty
responsibilities, while staying faithful to the U.S. judicial system.
It may not be an ideal solution, but it will constitute good faith
action by the states and a good start.
D. Miscellaneous Instances of Implementation and Compliance
The following instances demonstrate that across the United
States, some courts, states, and localities are attempting to fulfill
their good faith obligation to give full effect to the Vienna Con-
vention.
Following the ICJ decision in Avena, California Attorney
General Bill Lockyer struggled to determine how the decision
would affect the twenty-eight Mexican nationals on death row in
287. VCLT, supra note 31, art. 26.
288. See supra Part VI.E.1 and accompanying notes.
289. As can be seen in the next section, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
took note of the decision of the ICJ in staying the execution of Torres, while remaining
steadfast in its commitment to the U.S. judicial system.
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California. 29 ° Attorney General Lockyer turned to the U.S. De-
partment of State and other states in similar circumstances to
determine the best course of action. 29' In addition, he intends
to remind District Attorneys to provide consular notification to
foreign nationals in present and future cases. 29 2 Furthermore,
various Vienna Convention responsibilities have been codified in
the California Penal Code, 293 so as to prevent future violations.
Other states have also moved to codify the requirements of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. For instance, the state of
Texas has produced a sixty-seven page manual outlining require-
ments, procedures, and forms to be used in compliance with Ar-
ticle 36.294
In the state of Oregon, law enforcement officials have taken
steps to cooperate with foreign consulates and to incorporate
the Vienna Convention's terms into Oregon law enforcement
agency procedures. 295 They concluded that a brief detention
would not suffice to trigger Article 36, paragraph 1(b) obliga-
tions and that the defendant's arrival at a jail is the triggering
point for notification.296 In addition, two major developments
illustrate Oregon's efforts towards Vienna Convention compli-
ance. 297  The first is that police recruits receive instructions
about the Vienna Convention included in their preparation to
become state-certified law enforcement officials. 29 ' The second
development is that a form of notification has been agreed upon
290. Death Penalty Information Center, Recent Developments from DPIC, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Of the twenty-eight men, two are
exempt from the ruling because they dual citizenship or were advised of their Vienna
Convention rights. Nine other men were, in fact, notified of their rights, but the ICJ
determined that it was not in a timely fashion. Id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. Cal. Penal Code § 834(c) (West 2003).
294. See Harrill, supra note 84, at 584 n.131; see also Greg Abbott, Attorney General of
Texas, Magistrate's Guide to Consular Notification Under the Vienna Convention.
295. See Peter Shepherd, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: An Oregon
Law Enforcement Perspective, 11 WILLAMErrE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 53, 53-54 (2004).
296. See id. at 55-56.
297. See id. The Oregon Attorney General convened a group in 2000 to explore
ways in which Oregon law enforcement officials could better comply with the Vienna
Convention. The Mexican Consul General for Oregon participated in the group, as did
the Oregon chapter of the ACLU, the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association,
the Oregon State Sheriffs Association, the Oregon District Attorneys Association, and
various academics. Id. at 58-59.
298. Id.
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to be used by all Oregon jail managers to notify aliens of their
consular notification rights at the time they are received at any
of Oregon's jails following an arrest.299 In addition, in 2003, the
Oregon Legislature codified the provisions of Article 36, amend-
ing various sections of Oregon statutes to comply with Vienna
Convention requirements. 00
The codification of provisions of the Vienna Convention by
state legislatures is a positive step towards nationwide implemen-
tation. Notwithstanding those efforts, codification at the federal
level will be sure to secure the implementation of Article 36, par-
agraph 1 (b), by every single state, as the states are bound to fed-
eral laws, which serve to supersede their own.
VIII. THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO
ENFORCE STATE COMPLIANCE WITH TREATIES
Several methods have been offered by which the federal
government can compel state compliance with its international
treaty obligations. However, even if the courts do find a right for
the defendant within Article 36 or the federal government passes
legislation which gives foreign nationals the right to consular no-
tification, the question still remains as to whether states can truly
be compelled to enforce that right.3 1
A. Reasons for State Non-compliance with Article 36, Paragraph 1 (b)
To arrive at a mechanism that will compel state compliance,
the reasons why states do not voluntarily comply must first be
understood. One reason is that still today, some jurisdictions are
unaware that there is a notice requirement.0 2 Notwithstanding
a booklet issued by the U.S. Department of State entitled Consu-
lar Notification and Access-Instructions for Federal, State and Local
Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in
the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them,
which has been distributed to federal, state, and local authorities
in order to advance adherence to Article 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention, total dissemination of information to all law enforce-
ment personnel nationwide remains incomplete.
299. Id.
300. See Harrill, supra note 84, at 584 n.131.
301. See Vadnais, supra note 18, at 323.
302. See id. at 332.
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A second reason is that some states arrest and imprison
many foreign nationals, which makes the notice requirement a
substantial burden on the courts and police, so they may choose
not to engage in notification. A third reason is that oftentimes,
foreign nationals cannot be readily identified as such or distin-
guished from U.S. citizens. Therefore, requiring law enforce-
ment officials to question every detainee as to their nationality is
a burden that is often avoided.30 3
A final reason why voluntary state compliance has not been
a priority is that the requirement had not been taking very seri-
ously before the Breard case, including not by the federal govern-
ment. A periodic State Department notice sent to the states' at-
torneys general was the federal government's only attempt to
urge compliance until Breard.30 4 After Breard, every state gover-
nor received information on the Vienna Convention from the
State Department as mentioned above, as well as "pocket-sized
reference cards for law enforcement officers" from the State De-
partment.3 05
All of the aforementioned reasons indicate that compliance
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention was not considered a
national priority from the signing of the treaty by the United
States in 1969. This lack of concern from the outset has served
to exacerbate the issue of treaty compliance to the present day.
B. Methods by Which Congress can Ensure Compliance
As the federal government is responsible for the acts of its
organs-its component states-Congress must do what is within
its powers to secure state compliance with Article 36, and this
can be done in several ways. The following offers a selection of
possibilities, but is, by no means, exhaustive. One avenue is by
way of state financial appropriation. For instance, due to the fi-
nancial burden of the cost of incarcerating convicted foreign na-
tionals, Congress could provide financial incentives to states to
comply by offering funds to states who notify Congress of the
foreign nationals they detain.30 6 In addition, Congress could
303. See id. at 332-33.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 333.
306. See id. at 336; see also Brook, supra note 66.
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generally condition federal spending on states enacting laws to
improve treaty compliance.
Another way is by enacting federal legislation. For example,
Congress could expand habeas jurisdiction to allow federal
courts to hear procedurally defaulted Vienna Convention claims,
or Congress could enact a law requiring states to report statistics
of arrested foreign nationals to the federal government, thereby
ensuring compliance.3 °7 A potentially more effective method
would be the preemption of state death penalty statutes with a
federal statute to forbid the death penalty where the Vienna
Convention was violated. 0 8
Congress could also move to authorize a cause of action to
allow the Justice Department to bring an action to enforce the
Vienna Convention against the states. Or, Congress could order
federal officers, such as INS agents, to interview new arrivals at
local jails to determine nationality."0 9
Enacting federal legislation that gives full effect to Article
36, paragraph 1, in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2,
would, indeed, be the most expedient means of remedying the
continuous problem of Vienna Convention interpretation3 10 as
well as violations in localities that are unaware of the Vienna
Convention requirements. Regardless of these measures, Con-
gress cannot enact a law to force a state judiciary to reverse a
decision it has already rendered. Due to the separation of pow-
ers in the United States, the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the government remain independent and distinct
entities, with the powers of one branch being extremely limited
in its ability to intrude upon the powers of another. And so, as a
solution to the issues raised in Avena, the U.S. Congress does not
have the power to compel state courts to adhere to the decision
of the ICJ.
C. Executive Methods of Compliance Enforcement
Scholars have offered several ways for the executive to rem-
edy violations and to effect state compliance. These methods
have included: (1) the use of stays of execution and executive
307. See Vadnais, supra note 18, at 336.
308. See Brook, supra note 66, at 594-97.
309. See Vadnais, supra note 18, at 336.
310. See Green, supra note 101, at 531.
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orders to prevent those sentenced to death from being executed
pending review of their cases; (2) federal government lawsuits
against offending states in federal court; and (3) the granting of
wider powers to foreign Nations to sue states in federal court.3"'
The U.S. Attorney General has sued state or local governmental
authorities that conducted activities that put the United States in
violation of treaty obligations." 2 It is, therefore, still possible for
the Attorney General to bring suit against states for Vienna Con-
vention violations.
As mentioned earlier, the methods that the executive can
use do not include forcing the courts to overturn their own deci-
sions. 313 And so, as the state and local authorities have been the
bodies responsible for the lack of implementation, it is proper
for the executive and Congress to take the measures available to
them to secure compliance. With respect to the decisions of the
courts, however, compliance enforcement is much more com-
plex.
IX. INCORPORATING AVENA INTO MIRANDA: A POSITIVE
NEXT STEP AND POSSIBLE SOLUTION
As seen previously in this Article, several methods have been
proffered to secure state observance of federal treaty obliga-
tions."' Although these methods appear plausible, the only way
in which they can be practical is if those who are in positions to
take action, in fact, do so. Codifying the Vienna Convention
rights at the state level into a Miranda-type warning would be a
more effective preventative method that would ensure that fu-
ture violations are averted. This Miranda-type warning would be
effected by informing detained individuals-all detainees and
not only foreign nationals-of the right to consular access under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) at the moment they are taken into
custody.31 5 In doing so, the requirement of "without delay" of
311. See Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 62, at 2671-74.
312. See Quigley, supra note 16, at 51. For instance, there have been cases where
local governments attempted to collect property taxes from the missions of foreign gov-
ernments, and the United States was obligated by treaty to allow tax-free use of premises
by foreign governments for diplomatic purposes. Id.
313. See supra Part VII.C.
314. See supra Part VII and accompanying notes.
315. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36, 1 (b) (describing the rights of
foreign nationals upon arrest).
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paragraph 1 (b) as expounded upon by the ICJ in Avena316 will
certainly be fulfilled. By reading those in custody their Miranda
rights as well as their Vienna Convention rights, the number of
Vienna Convention claims are sure to be reduced, if not entirely
eliminated, precluding the possibility of judicial decisions being
reviewed due to Vienna Convention violations.
A. Implementing Miranda v. Arizona
Miranda v. Arizona marked a turning point in U.S. criminal
jurisprudence. The Miranda decision provides that unless a de-
fendant has received notice of the right to remain silent and the
right to assistance of counsel, or unless the defendant has waived
those rights, any statements made by criminal defendants to law
enforcement officials in a custodial setting may not be intro-
duced into evidence against the defendant. 317 These Miranda
rights are to be read to a detainee prior to interrogation. The
Supreme Court in Miranda stated:
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way
and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-in-
crimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully ef-
fective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored, the following measures are required.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
316. See supra Part V.B and accompanying notes.
317. Pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, a de-
tainee has right not to incriminate himself as well as a right to counsel. The Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. 5 (emphasis added). The Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CoNsT. amend 6 (emphasis
added).
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to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be af-
forded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive
these rights and agree to answer questions or make a state-
ment. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial no evidence ob-
tained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.3"'
Prior to the Miranda case, difficulties in determining
whether a confession was compelled often led to litigation to de-
termine the voluntariness of a defendant's statements. Miranda
was designed to reduce those litigation problems,3 19 because the
process of litigation was unable to depict what exactly took place
when a defendant was in police custody. 320 The Supreme Court
in Miranda implied that the Miranda warnings would greatly re-
duce the need for prospective litigation if defendants were pro-
vided with the opportunity to exercise their rights. 2 1
After Miranda, the concern about litigation may have dissi-
pated, but a new fear replaced it-that the conviction rate would
drop and dangerous criminals would be set free. There were
studies done in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania as well as Wash-
ington, D.C. among others, in the wake of Miranda to determine
what effect, if any, the decision had on law enforcement, confes-
sions and convictions. 2 2 In Allegheny County, the conviction
rates slightly dropped for the first six months after Miranda, but
in the first half of 1967 the rate came back up and, in fact, was
higher than at any time from the period of 1964 to 1966.323 In
the Washington, D.C. study it was determined that despite Mi-
randa, defendants gave confessions and asserted their rights at
318. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
319. See Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1986).
320. See id. at 8.
321. See id. at 9 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).
322. See id. at 17-8.
323. See id. at 17-18 (quoting Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Mi-
randa in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PiT-. L. REv. 1, 19 (1967)).
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about the same rate as before the decision.3 24 As a result of Mi-
randa, notwithstanding reasonable concerns, rights afforded in
that decision endowed the detainee with constitutional protec-
tions, while at the same time not impairing the interests of law
enforcement. 325
The full nationwide implementation of Miranda took time,
even years, before the difficulties with compliance were ironed
out. Although law enforcement was not impeded, studies also
concluded that Miranda was not producing the results it was
seeking.126 Detainees routinely waived their rights after been no-
tified and chose not to remain silent and be represented by
counsel. Their acts have been attributed to lack of understand-
ing as well as negligence on the part of law enforcement in mak-
ing the rights clear and comprehensible.3 2' As late as 1970, exe-
cution of the Miranda decision was lagging. As Miranda rights
became a more familiar concept across the United States in the
early 1970's and in later years, the effects of Miranda began to
appear with more detainees choosing to exercise their rights.3 28
In the years after the Miranda decision, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation published a training document entitled Police In-
terrogation: The Miranda Rule to guide law enforcement agents in
their implementation of the Miranda warnings. 329 This docu-
ment was originally published in 1968 as a guideline and was
later updated in 1974 with the purpose of "accept[ing] the [Mi-
randa] decision for what it is-the law of the land-and to un-
derstand its application. ' 330 This document was used by law en-
forcement agents nationwide and provided them with the stan-
dards needed to give effect to the Supreme Court's decision.3
324. See id. at 18 (citing Paul Alexander, RichardJ. Medalie & Leonard Zeitz, Cus-
todial Interrogation in Our Nation's Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 1347 (1968)).
325. See id. at 21.
326. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. Rv. 1417, 1462-63
(1985).
327. See Gerald M. Caplan, Miranda Revisited, 93 YALE LJ. 1375, 1380 (1984) (re-
viewing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAw AND POLITICS (1983)).
328. See id.
329. DONALD J. McLAUGHLIN, POLICE INTERROGATION: THE MIRANDA RULE (Quan-
tico, Va., FBI Academy 1974).
330. Id. at 1.
331. SeeJ. Lewis Cannon, Robert L. Flanders & Otis H. Stephens, Law Enforcement
and the Supreme Court: Police Perception of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REv. 407,
429 (1972).
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B. Comparing Vienna Convention Rights with Miranda Rights
In the aftermath of Breard, scholars and civil libertarians
have argued that the legally correct decision in Breard would
have been the reversal of the defendant's conviction and the
conception of a "Miranda-type exclusionary rule for violations of
international rights." '32 The reason suggested to support this
notion is that, otherwise, it would not be possible to prompt lo-
cal law enforcement to comply with the Vienna Convention un-
less courts overturn convictions. 3
The Vienna Convention right to consular access involves an
affirmative corollary duty upon the arresting state to inform the
detainee of his consular rights. These rights, which are pre-
mised on the arresting authorities' duty to inform, allow the for-
eign detainee the option to exercise or waive the rights, as in
Miranda.334 Miranda is, therefore, comparable to the Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), duty to inform-under Miranda, arresting of-
ficers must inform detainees of their rights prior to interroga-
tion. So, too, the Vienna Convention requirement of notifica-
tion must be executed in a timely fashion in accordance with the
paragraph 1 (b) obligation to provide the information "without
delay. '3 5 Taking into consideration the apparent similarities, it
would, thus, seem logical and fully comprehensible for state and
local authorities, who are already accustomed to informing de-
tainees of their Miranda rights, to also inform them of their right
to consular access.
C. The ICJ on Miranda
The ICJ in Avena makes mention of the use of the Miranda
warnings by several states as a method of providing Vienna Con-
vention notification. 336 The Court noted that it is understanda-
ble that, due the multiculturalism and ethnic diversity of the
U.S. populace, the appearance of a person and the language
that person speaks does not necessarily indicate that the person
332. Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEYJ. INT'L. L.
147, 149 (1999).
333. See id. at 149.
334. See id. at 151.
335. See id. at 152; see also supra Part VI.B and accompanying notes (discussing
"without delay").
336. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 44, 64
(Mar. 31).
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is a foreign national.33 v Considering these facts, the heterogene-
ity of the population would render it expedient to inquire as to a
detained individual's nationality upon detention. 33 "8
The United States advised the ICJ that, in addition to some
law enforcement authorities' routine inquiry of detainees re-
garding U.S. citizenship, some local jurisdictions have also pro-
vided a parallel reading of Vienna Convention rights alongside
the traditional Miranda warnings.33 9 It should be noted, how-
ever, that not all jurisdictions offer that parallel reading. Al-
though the ICJ stated that "neither the terms of the Convention
as normally understood, nor its object and purpose, suggest that
'without delay' is to be understood as 'immediately upon arrest
and before interrogation,' "340 the ICJ did find that doing so may
be beneficial to the implementation of the Vienna Convention.
The ICJ noted that providing a parallel reading would be of cer-
tain benefit in that "were each individual to be told at [the time
of his arrest or detention] that, should he be a foreign national,
he is entitled to ask for his consular post to be contacted, compli-
ance with [the notification] requirement under Article 36, para-
graph 1(b), would be greatly enhanced."341
D. Equating Miranda with Avena
Just as being informed of the constitutional right to be pro-
tected against self-incrimination is necessary to safeguard a de-
tainee from a confession induced by police coercion, a foreign
national who has rights on par with any constitutional amend-
ment pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, 42 should be informed
of his consular rights so as to be protected against intrusion by
an unknown legal system. Equating the Miranda rights with the
right to receive information about consular notification "without
delay" as seen in Avena, indicates that a detainee's awareness of
both sets of rights would not only bring the United States into
compliance with their treaty obligations by giving full effect to
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See id. Perhaps this has been pursuant to the suggestions of the Department
of State guidebook. See also supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
340. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 48, 85.
341. Id. at 44, 64.
342. See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
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Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), as required by Avena, but would also
ensure the proper administration of justice.
In one case that essentially equates Miranda warnings with
the Vienna Convention, Delaware v. Reyes in 1999, a Delaware
court held that despite that a defendant had been given Miranda
warnings, the violation of the defendant's Vienna Convention
rights must result in the suppression of evidence in the case. 34 3
A broad and nationwide implementation of the principles set
forth in this decision could be a positive next step in remedying
Vienna Convention violations.
To return to Torres, the Oklahoma Court expounded upon
why the lack of consular notification resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. 44 With respect to the third prong of the test employed
by the Oklahoma Court as described in Part VI of this Article,
the requirement that it be likely that the consulate would have
assisted Torres was adequately proven to the court. The govern-
ment of Mexico generally provides extensive services to its na-
tionals who are detained abroad including having a "systematic
procedure to offer very specific consular assistance" 345 in defend-
ing the cases. This demonstrates that consular notification is
necessary at the outset of a foreign national's detention in order
to provide the best possible chances for the detainee to receive a
proper defense.
Therefore, just as detainees are generally read their Mi-
randa rights upon detention so as to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, so, too, it is imperative for law enforcement officials to
read detained foreign nationals their Vienna Convention rights
from the very moment they are taken into custody. The uniform
nationwide implementation of the requirement of notification
of consular access is an essential tool that would ensure that de-
tained foreign nationals receive the fairest possible representa-
tion their consulates can provide.
E. A Recommendation
Some localities do offer a method of compliance with the
Vienna Convention, the law enforcement officials there main-
343. Delaware v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (Del. 1999); Epps, supra note 19, at 29.
344. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 10.
345. See id. (discussing further details on the extensive assistance offered by the
government of Mexico).
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taining that they understand the need to inform consulates
when foreign citizens are arrested.34 6 Although experts agree
that the law is not clearly comprehended in many of the 26,000
nationwide police departments, several police departments have
become more conscious of notifying detainees of their Vienna
Convention rights.3 47 Regardless of the attempts by local author-
ities, however, there is still no method of nationwide uniform
application that would facilitate more effective implementation
of the Vienna Convention rights.
Notwithstanding the suggestion of the ICJ of a parallel read-
ing, an incorporated reading would be a more expeditious
method of facilitating notification. To eliminate the step of in-
quiring as to the nationality of the detainee, to avoid potential
Vienna Convention violations, and to ensure that the rights are
read in full, the Miranda warnings should be fully modified to
include the rights under the Vienna Convention. The rights of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) should be termed the "Avena rights"
and should be added to the Miranda rights as a new clause, in-
cluded in the reading at the time an individual is taken into cus-
tody by law enforcement agents. The inserted clause would read
as follows:
If you are a national of a State or Nation other than the
United States of America, you have the right to communicate
with the consular post of your nationality, if you so request.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by you, in
prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the au-
thorities without delay.
Just as Miranda rights can be waived, so, too, should Avena
rights be waivable. Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) begins with the
clause "if he so requests." 34 8 The duty to inform refers to the
346. See Siobhan Morrissey, U.S. Violates Right of 52 Mexican Citizens to Speak to Con-
sular Officials, Ruling Says, A.B.A.J. E-Report, Apr. 9, 2004, available at http://venus.soci.
niu.edu/-archives/ABOLISH/oct04/0594.html (citing Florida as an example of a state
that informs consulates when foreign citizens are arrested).
347. Chris Kraul, Mexicans on U.S. Death Row Denied Rights, Court Says, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2004, at Al. In Florida for example, police departments stress relevant parts of
the Vienna Convention to their officers because cases of foreign nationals arise so
often. The law enforcement handbook of the Miami-Dade Police Department high-
lights the treaty in its first few pages. The handbook includes instructions for officers
even for cases where the detainees come from countries not recognized by the United
States, such as Cuba. See Morrissey, supra note 346.
348. See Kraul, supra note 347. In Florida, for example, police departments stress
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obligation of the receiving State to inform the detainee of his or
her rights. The obligation to inform the sending State of the
detainee's existence is only triggered at the point that the de-
tainee requests assistance after being informed of the Avena
rights. As the Avena rights can be waived by the detainee they
would, therefore, be no greater an impediment to the adminis-
tration ofjustice than the Miranda rights. In actuality, the Avena
rights would serve to protect against future litigation, while the
waiver would serve to open the door for law enforcement to pro-
ceed.
Through incorporation of this clause into the Miranda
warnings as they currently exist, the law enforcement agents will
be sure to have notified foreign nationals of their rights, and in
so doing will have fulfilled the terms of Article 36, paragraph
1 (b), which requires "[t] he authorities [to] inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this subpara-
graph[.] " 4 The nationwide reading of the Miranda and Avena
rights together will be a breakthrough in combined interna-
tional and domestic law enforcement in the United States.
CONCLUSION
As the situation exists at present, the United States cannot
afford to continue to ignore the requirements of the Vienna
Convention. The U.S. government at every level must proceed
to engage in meaningful dialogue to reach a better conclusion,
one that affords sufficient respect to the treaty obligations it has
taken upon itself in the Vienna Convention, and respect of the
international community who are partners to that treaty.
What should be the greatest incentive for compliance by
courts is the duty to act in good faith, a duty the United States
adopted in signing the VCLT. It has been posited, however, that
ICJ decisions are not a controlling authority for United States
domestic courts, but rather, have merely persuasive authority.35 °
relevant parts of the Vienna Convention to their officers because cases of foreign na-
tionals arise so often. The law enforcement handbook of the Miami-Dade Police De-
partment highlights the treaty in its first few pages. The handbook includes instruc-
tions for officers even for cases where the detainees come from countries not recog-
nized by the United States, such as Cuba. See Morrissey, supra note 355.
349. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 36, 1 1 (b).
350. See, e.g., Arthur Mark Weisburd, International Judicial Decisions, Domestic Courts,
and the Foreign Affairs Power, 2004-2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 287.
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As seen in the Torres decision, courts are already taking steps of
their own accord to implement the ICJ decision, but there is still
a long way to go toward a uniform remedy. The February 28,
2005, Memorandum of President Bush only provides a solution
for the fifty-one Mexican nationals in the Avena case,351 but
makes no reference to future Vienna Convention claims. And
so, some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Medellin, may choose to disregard the ICJ decision in spite of
clear violations and refer only to what they consider to be their
highest authority, the U.S. Supreme Court. It appears, there-
fore, that the only true solution in that regard for future Vienna
Convention claims will come by way of the effective and binding
precedent of a Supreme Court decision which recognizes the ob-
ligations of United States compliance with Article 36, paragraph
1(b), regardless of the doctrine of procedural default, in cases
involving foreign nationals detained on U.S. soil. Meanwhile,
what remains to be seen is whether courts will follow the path of
Torres or the path of Fifth Circuit in Medellin.
The more significant issue is whether the Avena decision
will be viewed as relevant enough to warrant a change in the
application of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Conven-
tion so as to provide a deterrent to future litigation in the
United States. To that effect, an incorporated reading that in-
cludes Avena rights with Miranda rights would be a very positive
display of good faith as well as the most effective tool in uni-
formly applying Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and giving full effect
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
351. Memorandum, supra note 260.
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